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REVENGE PORN, STATE LAW, AND FREE 
SPEECH 
Paul J. Larkin, Jr.* 
       
          The ease of access to the Internet, coupled with the modern 
practice of sharing intimate digital photos between lovers, has given 
rise to a disturbing new trend known colloquially as “revenge porn”—
that is, the nonconsensual posting of images that were originally given 
to another with the implied expectation of confidentiality. That act 
involves a deep personal betrayal and can inflict serious emotional 
damage on the person whose image has been shared, sometimes 
resulting in grave consequences to the victim. And once those images 
reach the Internet, they are often circulated widely; the victims retain 
no control over who may view or share them.  
          This Article explores the types of laws that victims could use to 
seek justice, and it identifies relevant hurdles to relief. Several state tort 
laws, such as invasion of privacy, false light portrayal, defamation, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, could be used to combat 
revenge porn. Contract law may also provide a remedy through breach-
of-implied-agreement claims or the collateral doctrine of promissory 
estoppel. Some states have recently gone so far as to enact criminal 
statutes penalizing the practice of revenge porn, focusing on the 
victim’s lack of consent. Of course, the mere existence of a criminal law 
does not guarantee its enforcement, and such laws do not offer victims 
the possibility of being awarded damages. Moreover, as of yet, there 
have been no successful prosecutions under these statutes, so we do not 
know how they will be construed or will fare in court.   
          There are obstacles that a revenge porn victim must overcome. A 
defendant’s likely defense of consent could nullify such claims. In 
addition, the First Amendment Free Speech Clause will be said to 
impose an obstacle if a revenge porn victim seeks civil relief or if the 
government initiates a criminal prosecution. In fact, some would 
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Washington University; J.D. 1980 Stanford Law School; B.A. 1977 Washington & Lee 
University. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and should not be construed 
as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation. Tom Buchanan, Paul Cassell, 
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contend that no tort suit or prosecution could ever be successful. The 
argument would be that the First Amendment protects an individual 
against civil or criminal liability for publishing a lawfully obtained 
image honestly depicting the photographer’s subject, regardless of how 
unflattering the photograph may be or the effect that publication may 
have on the subject.   
          This Article, however, explains why consent and First 
Amendment defenses should be unsuccessful. Ultimately, the Article 
maintains, the law must adapt to the “selfie” and “sexting” generation 
in order to provide meaningful relief to individuals whose well-
intentioned—albeit ill-advised—attempts at flirtation achieve 
perpetual—and unwanted—fame and notoriety on the Internet. Intimate 
photographs are shared under circumstances giving rise to an implied 
agreement of confidentiality between the parties, and the Free Speech 
Clause does not shield a recipient against his broken promise not to 
share a photograph with others. Imposing tort and criminal liability on 
someone who breaches an agreement of confidentiality will not chill 
protected speech. It will only encourage people to keep their word. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION: THE PHENOMENON OF  
REVENGE PORN 
Like an elephant, the Internet never forgets. Information 
potentially lives in “the cloud” forever.1 That is good if you are 
looking for an obscure music video or film clip. That is bad if your 
high school posts your freshman-year class photo. That is horrible if 
someone posts a compromising picture of you. Internet images have 
the half-life of Tellurium-128.2 It also is difficult, if not impossible, 
to delete information from the Internet, even with the consent of the 
party who posted it and the help of the site on which it sits, because 
the zeroes and ones may exist in a cache owned by a search engine 
such as Ask, Google, or Yahoo!3 Information also may reside in the 
server of a firm that collects and sells customer information.4 In fact, 
some companies, such as Spokeo or DoubleClick, specialize in “data 
aggregation”—that is, the scouring of social media websites, such as 
Facebook, for personal information about users and the sale of that 
information to a company that uses it to offer you particular goods or 
services.5 In an age when 2.8 billion people are connected to the 
Internet6 and “you are what Google says you are,”7 the permanence 
of unflattering information about us on the Internet poses a troubling 
prospect for us all.  
 
 1. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, The Dead Past, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 117 (2012), 
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/topics/64-SLRO-117.pdf. 
 2. Tellurium-128 has the longest half-life of any known radioactive isotope, approximately 
2.2 septillion years (2.2 x 1021 years). See Isotope Data for Tellurium 128, PHOTOGRAPHIC 
PERIODIC TABLE, http://periodictable.com/Isotopes/052.128/index2.p.full.dm.html (last visited 
Aug. 21, 2014).  
 3. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON 
THE INTERNET 234–35 n.1 (2007). 
 4. See Anton Troianovski, Phone Firms Sell Data on Customers, WALL ST. J., May 21, 
2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323463704578497153556847658.html. 
 5. See, e.g., LORI ANDREWS, I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT YOU DID 21–24 
(2011). For a recent White House report on the collection of data from private parties, see JOHN 
PODESTA ET AL., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, 
PRESERVING VALUE (2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs 
/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf. 
 6. See Internet Usage Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS, 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last updated Dec. 31, 2013). 
 7. Megan Angelo, You Are What Google Says You Are, WIRED.COM (Feb. 11, 2009), 
http://www.wired.com/2009/02/you-are-what-go/. 
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The ability for someone to start life over, to reinvent or reboot 
oneself, offers us a valuable opportunity for a fresh start. It enables 
us to avoid being chained to our mistakes like Jacob Marley.8 In 
order for that opportunity truly to be effective, however, we must be 
able to leave some of our past behind. Today, that is a difficult feat to 
accomplish in the United States, given the First Amendment9 
(although it soon may become less difficult in the European 
Union10). Information on the Internet is available for a far longer 
period than when only the spoken or written word could damage our 
 
 8. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Speech, Privacy, and Reputation on the Internet, in THE 
OFFENSIVE INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND REPUTATION 15, 18 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. 
Nussbaum eds., 2010) (“People want to have the option of ‘starting over,’ of reinventing 
themselves throughout their lives. . . . In the past, episodes of youthful experimentation and 
foolishness were eventually forgotten, giving us an opportunity to start anew, to change, and to 
grow. But with so much information online, it is harder to make these moments forgettable. 
People must now live with the digital baggage of their pasts.”); Lawrence M. Friedman, Name 
Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and Assorted Matters in Legal History, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1093, 
1112 (2002) (“American society is and has been a society of extreme mobility, in every sense of 
the word: social, economic, geographical. Mobility has meant freedom; mobility has been an 
American value. People often moved from place to place; they shed an old life like a snake 
molting its skin. They took on new lives and new identities. They went from rags to riches, from 
log cabins to the White House. American culture and law put enormous emphasis on second 
chances.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 9. For the argument that there should be a limited right to be forgotten under American law, 
see Robert Kirk Walker, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 257 (2012). For some baby 
steps in that direction, see United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014) (ruling that when 
the government copies a computer hard drive pursuant to a warrant-authorized search, it cannot 
indefinitely retain and later use copied information that is not responsive to the search warrant). 
 10. Over the past few years, the European Community has moved toward creation of a right 
to start over digitally, a right to be forgotten or at least to edit one’s past. See, e.g., Commission 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data (General Data Protection Regulation), at 9 COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf; Jeffrey 
Rosen, The Right to be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 88 (2012); Marc Rotenberg & 
David Jacobs, Updating the Law of Information Privacy: The New Framework of the European 
Union, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 605 (2013); Paul M. Schwartz, The E.U.-U.S. Privacy 
Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966 (2013). On May 13, 
2014, the European Court of Justice ruled that an individual can compel search engines such as 
Google to remove reputation-damaging information. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. 
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (May 13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste 
.jsf?num=C-131/12. It remains to be seen whether that judgment will enable victims of revenge 
porn to demand that search engines remove unwanted photographs from their files accessible only 
from computers within the European Union or worldwide. That decision is in line with the law of 
the European Union in related fields. See Mila Versteeg, Unpopular Constitutionalism, 89 IND. 
L.J. 1133, 1146 (2014) (noting that the European nations “do not extend the freedom of 
expression of hate speech, Holocaust denial, or even the selling of Nazi paraphernalia on Yahoo 
and eBay” (footnotes omitted)). 
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reputation or disclose our private affairs.11 The permanence of 
information on the Internet carries a past insult or injury forward, 
potentially forever, making an original sin into an eternal one.12 
American law has never recognized a “right to be forgotten” in 
part because, before the last few decades, no such right was ever 
necessary. Before the digitalization of photography and the advent of 
the Internet, the transaction costs of sharing information limited its 
distribution to those few recipients that average people chose 
themselves.13 Only celebrities—presidents, movie stars, professional 
athletes, and the like—were at risk of having their everyday exploits 
and activities photographed and shown to the world.14 But that day is 
gone forever. Scott McNealy of Sun Microsystems once stated that 
“[y]ou already have zero privacy. Get over it.”15 Many observers, 
regretfully, agree with him.16 We may not yet reside in Marshall 
McLuhan’s “global village”17 (or in George Orwell’s Hades-like 
version of it),18 but the ubiquity of camera-equipped cell phones and 
 
 11. Judge (later Justice) Benjamin Cardozo once made that point in connection with the 
written word. “What gives the sting to writing is its permanence in form. The spoken word 
dissolves, but the written one abides and ‘perpetuates the scandal.’” Ostrowe v. Lee, 175 N.E. 
505, 506 (N.Y. 1931). Scandals recorded digitally can last even longer and be more widely 
available to future generations. 
 12. “[I]n today’s world, foolish deeds are preserved forever on the Internet.” SOLOVE, supra 
note 3, at 42. “Internet shaming creates an indelible blemish on a person’s identity. Being shamed 
in cyberspace is akin to being marked for life. It’s similar to being forced to wear a digital scarlet 
letter or being branded or tattooed. People acquire permanent digital baggage. They are unable to 
escape their past, which is forever etched into Google’s memory.” Id. at 94. That problem is 
exacerbated when an unflattering picture is the only information widely available. People who 
know someone well can measure the significance of a particular mistake against whatever else 
they know about that person’s personality, character, and accomplishments. That is impossible if 
someone is defined across the Internet by one story or image. See, e.g., JEFFREY ROSEN, THE 
UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 8–9 (2006) (inaccurate 
stereotypes are likely to stem from this, potentially ruining a person’s reputation, just like what 
happened to Monica Lewinsky when it was discovered she sent the President a book about phone 
sex). 
 13. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Big Data in Small Hands, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 81, 81 (2013). 
 14. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 117, at 859–62 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing common law right to discuss public figures and 
matters of public importance). 
 15. Solove, supra note 8, at 19–20. 
 16. See, e.g., SIMSON GARFINKLE, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 
21ST CENTURY (2000); CHARLES SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY (1999); REG WHITAKER, THE 
END OF PRIVACY (2000). 
 17. See MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN (W. 
Terrence Gordon ed., Gingko Press 2003) (1964). 
 18. See GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (Alfred A. Knopf 1987) (1948). 
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the ease of uploading photographs or videos onto the Internet means 
that now we all face the risk of being made into a celebrity, like it or 
not. What happens in Vegas may stay in Vegas, but not what appears 
on Facebook.19 
Recently, women have found themselves in that predicament in 
a particularly infuriating and odious way.20 As if trying to prove the 
maxim that “Men are pigs,” a punch line that has launched a 
thousand sitcoms (and, some would say, defames our porcine 
friends), men have posted on the Internet photographs of naked 
former wives and girlfriends, sometimes in intimate positions or 
activities.21 Recipients sometimes take the images with the consent 
of the subject, but perhaps 10 percent of these images are taken 
surreptitiously.22 Far more often than not, however, the victims 
themselves are the photographers, taking what are colloquially 
known as “selfies.”23 Some would-be Playboy publishers have even 
 
 19. ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 5. For examples of average members of the public 
involuntarily made into “Internet stars” and the personal trauma that they suffered from their new 
status, see SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 1–2, 38–48. 
 20. Women are the principal—but not the exclusive—victims of revenge porn. See Danielle 
Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 
353 (2014) (reporting the results of a survey that ninety percent of those victimized by revenge 
porn were female). I will use the feminine gender for pronouns in this essay unless the context 
dictates otherwise. 
 21. One website has described the phenomenon as follows:  
What is the issue? Non-consensual pornography is the distribution of sexually graphic 
images of individuals without their consent. This includes images that were originally 
obtained without consent (e.g., hidden recordings or recordings of sexual assaults) as 
well as images originally obtained with consent within the context of a private or 
confidential relationship (e.g., images consensually given to an intimate partner who 
later distributes them without consent, popularly referred to as ‘revenge porn’). Non-
consensual pornography does not include images taken of individuals in public or of 
people engaged in unsolicited and unlawful sexual activity, such as flashing. 
Mary Anne Franks, Revenge Porn: A Quick Guide, ST. INNOVATION EXCHANGE, 
http://alicelaw.org/uploads/asset/asset_file/1979/Criminalizing_Revenge_Porn_Quick_Guide.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 21, 2014). See also, e.g., Alexa Tsoulis-Reay, A Brief History of Revenge Porn, 
N.Y. MAG. (July 21, 2013), http://nymag.com/news/features/sex/revenge-porn-2013-7/. 
 22. See Amanda Levendowski, Note, Using Copyright to Combat Revenge Porn, 3 N.Y.U. J. 
INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 422, 424 n.9 (2014). That conduct may violate so-called “Peeping Tom” 
statutes. Peeping Tom laws prohibit someone from peeping through doors, windows, or similar 
openings for the purpose of invading the privacy of the parties inside. The term originates from 
an English legend. A young man named Tom supposedly gawked at Lady Godiva as she rode 
naked on a horse in the city of Coventry to protest taxation. For his crime, the authorities blinded 
Tom. 
 23. Some commentators have estimated that perhaps 80 percent of revenge porn victims 
took “selfies.” See Christina Jedra, Millenials Deal with Consequences of ‘Revenge Porn’, USA 
TODAY, Oct. 5, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/05/college-students-
revenge-porn/2927337/; Heather Kelly, New California ‘Revenge Porn’ Law May Miss Some 
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gone so far as to identify the person in the photo and provide her 
online or real-life contact information.24 That practice—posting 
intimate photographs of naked exes—is colloquially known as 
“involuntary pornography” or, more maliciously but perhaps more 
accurately, “revenge porn.”25 
 
Victims, CNN (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/03/tech/web/revenge-porn-law-
california/. 
 24. The phenomenon began in 2010 with the launch of a now-defunct submission-based 
website called IsAnyoneUp by Hunter Moore. Moore supposedly came up with the idea when he 
repeatedly received nude photographs from a woman. Moore created the website, posted the 
images to it, and offered the web-browsing public the opportunity to post images. See Camille 
Dodero, Hunter Moore Makes a Living Screwing You, VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 4, 2012, 
http://www.villagevoice.com/2012-04-04/news/revenge-porn-hunter-moore-is-anyone-up/; Dylan 
Love, It Will Be Hard to Stop the Rise of Revenge Porn, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 8, 2013, 7:00 PM) 
http://www.businessinsider.com/revenge-porn-2013-2; Jessica Roy, The Battle Over Revenge 
Porn: Can Hunter Moore, the Web’s Vilest Entrepreneur, Be Stopped?, BETABEAT (Dec. 4, 
2012), http://betabeat.com/2012/12/the-battle-over-revenge-porn-can-hunter-moore-the-webs-
vilest-entrepreneur-be-stopped/. The federal government subsequently charged Moore with a 
violation of a federal statute designed to prevent computer hacking. See infra note 37. 
 25. Commentators have written extensively on this subject in the Blogosphere, see, e.g., 
infra note 26, but books and academic or professional journals have only begun to discuss it. See, 
e.g., Anupam Chander, Youthful Indiscretion in an Internet Age, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: 
PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND REPUTATION, supra note 8, at 124; DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE 
CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014); Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum, Introduction, in THE 
OFFENSIVE INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND REPUTATION, supra note 8, at 9; SOLOVE, supra 
note 3, at 98; Citron & Franks, supra note 20; David Gray et al., Fighting Cybercrime After 
United States v. Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 745, 794 (2013); Levendowski, supra 
note 22; Casey Martinez, Note, An Argument for States to Outlaw ‘Revenge Porn’ and for 
Congress to Amend 47 U.S.C. § 230: How Our Current Laws Do Little to Protect Victims, 14 U. 
PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 236 (2014); Lorelei Laird, Victims Are Taking On ‘Revenge Porn’ 
Websites for Posting Photos They Didn’t Consent To, ABA JOURNAL (Nov. 8, 2013), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/victims_are_taking_on_revenge_porn_websites_for
_posting_photos_they_didnt_c/. 
A closely related phenomenon is “sexting”: the practice, often done by minors, of taking 
sexually suggestive or explicit text messages or images and transmitting them to someone else by 
a cell phone or over the Internet. See Sara Wastler, The Harm in “Sexting”?: Analyzing the 
Constitutionality of Child Pornography Statutes that Prohibit the Voluntary Production, 
Possession, and Dissemination of Sexually Explicit Images by Teenagers, 33 HARV. J. L. & 
GENDER 687, 687 (2010); David Rosen, Sexting: The Latest Innovation in Porn, 
COUNTERPUNCH (Mar. 29, 2005), http://www.counterpunch.org/2009/03/25/sexting-the-latest-
innovation-in-porn/ (describing sexting as “a post-modern form of flirting, a game of sexual show 
& tell”). The practice is not an isolated phenomenon. See Wastler, supra, at 691 n.26 (collecting 
news articles about the phenomenon). Studies have estimated that between 30 and upwards of 60 
percent of teenagers have sent or received such a text message. See Julia Halloran McLaughlin, 
Crime and Punishment: Teen Sexting in Context, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 135, 140–41 (2010). 
Aside from the revenge porn issues that sexting raises, there is the additional problem that, if a 
minor is the subject, persons involved in the transmission of the image could be prosecuted for 
the distribution of child pornography. See, e.g., Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (M.D. 
Pa. 2009) (granting a preliminary injunction against prosecuting a minor for sexting under the 
state’s child pornography laws), aff’d sub nom. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010); 
Mary Graw Leary, Self-Produced Child Pornography: The Appropriate Societal Response to 
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Far from being a cyberspace practical joke, revenge porn has 
generated considerable outrage.26 The posting of such images on a 
website has seriously harmed some victims by leading to a 
debilitating loss of self-esteem, crippling feelings of humiliation and 
shame, discharge from employment, verbal and physical harassment, 
and even stalking.27 Those harms are multiplied if, to use the 
 
Juvenile Self-Sexual Exploitation, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1 (2007); Elizabeth M. Ryan, 
Sexting: How the State Can Prevent a Moment of Indiscretion from Leading to a Lifetime of 
Unintended Consequences for Minors and Young Adults, 96 IOWA L. REV. 357 (2010); Wastler, 
supra, at 693–701 (discussing statutory interpretation and constitutional issues raised by 
prosecuting a minor for sexting of selfies); Ellen Goodman, Is ‘Sexting’ Same as Porn?, BOS. 
GLOBE, Apr. 24, 2009, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009 
/04/24/is_sexting_same_as_porn/; Chris Matyszczyk, Teen Charged With Child Porn for 
Allegedly Tweeting Nude Selfies, CNET (Feb. 9, 2014, 8:11 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news 
/teen-charged-with-child-porn-for-allegedly-tweeting-nude-selfies/; Karen Seidman, Child 
Pornography Laws ‘Too Harsh’ to Deal With Minors Sexting Photos Without Consent, Experts 
Say, NAT’L POST, Nov. 16, 2013, http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/11/16/child-pornography 
-laws-too-harsh-to-deal-with-minors-sexting-photos-without-consent-experts-say/.  
Finally, there are a variety of other similar types of activities on the Internet, such as listing 
plaintiffs in medical malpractice lawsuits, identifying parties who violate express lane minimum 
occupancy rules, or identifying physicians who perform abortions. See Planned Parenthood v. 
American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); SOLOVE, supra 
note 3, at 98–101. Those practices raise many of the same important tort law and First 
Amendment issues that are discussed in this Article. Those practices, however, are beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
 26. See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 183–84; Emily Bazelon, Why Do We Tolerate 
Revenge Porn?, SLATE (Sept. 25, 2013, 6:21 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x 
/doublex/2013/09/revenge_porn_legislation_a_new_bill_in_california_doesn_t_go_far_enough.ht
ml; The Editors, Tackling the Menace of Revenge Porn, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Oct. 13, 2013, 6:00 
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-13/tackling-the-menace-of-revenge-porn.html; 
Erin Fuchs, Here’s What the Constitution Says About Posting Naked Pictures of Your Ex to the 
Internet, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/is-revenge-porn-
protected-by-the-first-amendment-2013-9; Eric Goldman, What Should We Do About Revenge 
Porn Sites Like Texxxan?, TECH. & POL’Y L. BLOG (Feb. 9, 2013), http://blog.ericgoldman.org 
/archives/2013/02/what_should_we.htm; Neal Karlinsky et al., FBI Investigates ‘Revenge Porn’ 
Website Founder, ABC NEWS (May 22, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/fbi-
investigates-revenge-porn-website-founder/story?id=16405425#.ULVO1uOe_6B; Love, supra 
note 24; Amanda Marcotte, How to Fight Revenge Porn? Make It a Crime, SLATE (Sept. 24, 
2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2013/09/24/revenge_porn_is_domestic_abuse_it 
_should_be_a_crime.html; Maureen O’Conner, The Crusading Sisterhood of Revenge-Porn 
Victims, N.Y. MAG (Aug. 29, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://nymag.com/thecut/2013/08/crusading-
sisterhood-of-revenge-porn-victims.html. 
 27. Erica Goode, Victims Push Laws to End Online Revenge Posts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/24/us/victims-push-laws-to-end-online-revenge-posts 
.html?hp&_r=1& (“The effects can be devastating. Victims say they have lost jobs, been 
approached in stores by strangers who recognized their photographs, and watched close 
friendships and family relationships dissolve. Some have changed their names or altered their 
appearance. ‘Sometimes I want to get into a fetal position and cry,’ said [a victim] who added that 
she gave up her job at a restaurant and was stalked by a man who sat outside her house in a car.”); 
see also, e.g., Chander, supra note 25, at 126. 
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vernacular, the images “go viral” and are repeatedly circulated across 
the Internet and from cell phone to cell phone. Some young women 
have committed suicide after being victimized by the widespread 
distribution of their nude pictures or, in one case, being tormented by 
fellow high school students.28 
Other victims have fought back.29 Some have asked websites to 
remove offending photographs on the ground that victims have a 
copyright in the images, which the website violates by posting them 
without their consent.30 Some websites have complied, but not all. In 
response, victims have filed damages actions against websites that 
have refused to delete the images.31 Those lawsuits, however, have 
generally been unsuccessful.32 The principal obstacle is section 230 
of the Communications Decency Act of 1996,33 which provides that 
a website cannot be treated as “the publisher or speaker” of material 
 
 28. See California Moves to Ban “Revenge”/“Hate” Porn, MR. CONSERVATIVE (June 6, 
2013), http://www.mrconservative.com/2013/06/18520-california-moves-to-ban-revengehate 
-porn/. In April 2013, three boys sexually assaulted a 15-year-old girl at a party and later posted 
pictures of the attack on the Internet. The girl later committed suicide. “According to the family, 
it wasn’t the sexual assault, but the later humiliation that drove her to take her life. The three boys 
were arrested, but that was too little, too late.” Id.; Chander, supra note 25, at 126. 
 29. Holly Jacobs, a victim of revenge porn, founded an organization called “End Revenge 
Porn” to help end this practice, as well as a support group for other victims, “Women Against 
Revenge Porn.” See END REVENGE PORN, http://www.endrevengeporn.org/ (last visited Aug. 21, 
2014); WARP, http://www.womenagainstrevengeporn.com/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2014). Another 
online organization, Without My Consent, offers advice to revenge porn victims (and others). See 
WITHOUT MY CONSENT, http://www.withoutmyconsent.org/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2014). 
Reasoning that two can play this game, some women have responded in kind by allowing women 
to post critical reviews of men. See Solove, supra note 8, at 17 (“Another site, Don’t Date Him 
Girl, invites women to post complaints about the men they have dated, along with real names and 
actual photographs.”); Deborah Schoeneman, What’s He Really Like? Check the Lulu App, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/21/fashion/social-networking-App 
-allows-women-to-rate-men.html?_r=0 (describing “a new, female-friendly social networking app 
that lets women anonymously review men who are their Facebook friends”). 
 30. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
(codified at scattered sections of Title 17 and 28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2006)). 
 31. See, e.g., Women Sue Revenge Porn Website, CNN (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.cnn.com 
/video/?/video/us/2013/01/25/pkg-revenge-porn-website.ktvt&iref=allsearch.; Laird, supra note 
25; Jessica Roy, Victims of Revenge Porn Mount Class Action Suit Against GoDaddy and 
Texxxan.com, BETABEAT (Jun. 7, 2013, 11:29 PM), http://betabeat.com/2013/01/victims-of 
-revenge-porn-mount-class-action-suit-against-godaddy-and-texxxan-com/. 
 32. Susanna Lichter, Unwanted Exposure: Civil and Criminal Liability for Revenge Porn 
Hosts and Posters, JOLT DIG. (May 28, 2013), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/privacy 
/unwanted-exposure-civil-and-criminal-liability-for-revenge-porn-hosts-and-posters. 
 33. Section 230 was part of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, which in turn was 
Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified, as 
amended, at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012)). 
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posted online by someone else.34 Section 230 does not literally grant 
a website immunity for posting revenge porn, but it has that effect as 
a practical matter as long as the website does not edit or revise 
posted material.35 Ironically, Congress enacted section 230 in order 
to encourage the free exchange of ideas over the Internet and to 
encourage websites voluntarily to monitor and delete obscene or 
offensive material, not to shelter items such as revenge porn.36 
Section 230 therefore serves as a classic example of the law of 
unintended consequences.37 
 
 34. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”). 
 35. See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1099–1106 (9th Cir. 2009); Chi. 
Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671–72 (7th Cir. 
2008); Universal Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(collecting cases ruling that 47 U.S.C. § 230 was designed to avoid imposing liability on 
companies who serve as intermediaries for Internet speech); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 
(9th Cir. 2003); Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 984–85 (10th Cir. 
2000); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997); Gavra v. Google, Inc., No. 
5-12-CV-06547-PSG, 2013 WL 3788241, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (dismissing defamation action 
against Google in reliance on section 230); SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 153–60. There are a few 
lower court decisions allowing claims to go forward against Internet service providers, but those 
cases involve odd fact patterns or are outliers. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1165–70 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (ruling that a website 
was not entitled to section 230 immunity because it drafted the roommate housing preference 
questionnaire and required answers to it); Levendowski, supra note 22, at 429–30. 
 36. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); see Fair Hous. Council of 
San Fernando Valley, 521 F.3d at 1163–64; Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 
1122 (9th Cir. 2003). The irony stems from Supreme Court decisions holding unconstitutional 
under the First Amendment Free Speech Clause provisions in the Communications Decency Act 
of 1996 defining “offensive” speech. See Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 
661 (2004); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 882 (1997). Those decisions have 
left in place the other sections of that statute enabling websites to avoid responsibility for posting 
the speech of others. See, e.g., Ken S. Myers, Wikimmunity: Fitting the Communications Decency 
Act to Wikipedia, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 163, 174 (2006). 
 37. A few other types of statutes could be relevant here. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(CFAA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012), makes it a crime (inter alia) to “hack” into someone else’s 
computer in certain circumstances. The federal government has used that statute to charge a party 
who hacks into someone else’s computer, copies intimate photographs, and posts them online. 
See Indictment, United States v. Moore, No. CR13-0917 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2013); Notorious 
‘Revenge’ Porn Site Operator Charged with Hacking, FOX NEWS (Jan. 24, 2014), 
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/01/24/notorious-revenge-porn-site-operator-charged-with 
-hacking/; Jessica Roy, Revenge-Porn King Hunter Moore Indicted on Federal Charges, TIME 
(Jan. 23, 2014), http://time.com/1703/revenge-porn-king-hunter-moore-indicted-by-fbi/. For 
further discussion of the Hunter Moore story, see supra note 24. For discussions of the CFAA, 
see Paul J. Larkin, Jr., United States v. Nosal: Rebooting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 8 
SETON HALL CIR. REV. 257, 260 & n.11 (2012) (collecting commentaries). Hacking into 
someone else’s computer has historically not been considered the most common way that revenge 
porn winds up on the Internet, so the CFAA may be of quite limited use. Nonetheless, the recent 
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By contrast, section 230 does not foreclose a tort action against 
the individual who posts revenge porn on a website,38 and some 
victims have brought damages actions against those parties.39 Such 
lawsuits, however, have met with mixed success.40 Commentators 
have suggested that courts are likely to find unpersuasive invasion-
of-privacy claims regarding photographs for which the subject 
knowingly and voluntarily posed and gave to a now-former partner.41 
 
high-profile theft and publication of nude photographs of several female celebrities, allegedly via 
hacking of their Apple “iCloud” accounts, has triggered an FBI investigation and could lead the 
Justice Department to seek charges under the CFAA. See, e.g., Alan Duke, FBI, Apple Investigate 
Nude Photo Leak Targeting Jennifer Lawrence, Others, CNN (Sept. 2, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/01/showbiz/jennifer-lawrence-photos/. In addition, federal and state 
laws criminalizing identity theft could be brought to bear against parties who publish identifying 
information about a victim. See Alleged Revenge Porn Site Operator Heads to Trial, YAHOO! 
NEWS (June 17, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/alleged-revenge-porn-operator-heads-trial 
-222143331.html. Finally, some prosecutors have used the laws prohibiting extortion against 
individuals who post revenge porn photos and later demand a fee for them to be taken down from 
a website. See id.; see also infra note 48. 
 38. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2012) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any 
State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section.”). Finding the person who 
posted the photograph may take some sleuthing. For the story of how one man tracks purveyors 
of revenge porn as a cyber–Sherlock Holmes, see Kashmir Hill, This Guy Hunts Down The Men 
Behind Revenge Porn Websites, FORBES (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites 
/kashmirhill/2014/04/23/this-guy-hunts-down-the-men-behind-revenge-porn-websites/. 
 39. See, e.g., Women Sue Revenge Porn Website, supra note 31; Jessica Roy, A Victim 
Speaks: Standing Up to a Revenge Porn Tormentor, BETABEAT (May 1, 2013), 
http://betabeat.com/2013/05/revenge-porn-holli-thometz-criminal-case; cf. Lindsey Bever, 
Fighting Back Against ‘Revenge Porn’, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2014, http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/04/28/fighting-back-against-revenge-porn/ 
(criminal prosecution). 
 40. Compare, e.g., Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993) (ruling for defendant in a 
case involving the surreptitious recording by a former boyfriend of a woman’s sexual activity, on 
the ground that Texas does not recognize a tort for the negligent infliction of emotional distress), 
and SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 119–20 (explaining that many plaintiffs in invasion-of-privacy 
lawsuits are unsuccessful), with, e.g., Doe v. Hofstetter, Civil Action No. 11-cv-02209-DME-
MJW, 2012 WL 2319052 (D. Colo. June 13, 2012) (ruling in plaintiff’s favor); Taylor v. Franko, 
Civil No. 09-00002 JMS/RLP, 2011 WL 2746714 (D. Hawaii July 12, 2011) (same); Pohle v. 
Cheatham, 724 N.E.2d 655, 659–61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting ex-husband’s argument that 
his former wife’s failure to seek the return of intimate pictures waived any later claim for 
invasion of privacy based on his publication of them); Sonia Azad, Houston Woman Wins 
$500,000 in Revenge Porn Lawsuit, ABC13 EYEWITNESS NEWS (Feb. 27, 2014), 
http://abc13.com/archive/9446283/. 
 41. See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 25, at 238 (“[V]ictims who report or discuss these 
postings are often blamed and written off ‘as stupid or slutty for taking the photos.’” (footnote 
and citation omitted)); Freddy Gray, To Avoid Revenge Porn, Don’t Let Someone Film You 
Having Sex, THE SPECTATOR (Apr. 7, 2014, 3:02 PM), http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/ 
culturehousedaily/2014/04/women-to-avoid-revenge-porn-stop-letting-men-film-you-having-sex/; 
Woodrow Hartzog, How to Fight Revenge Porn, ATLANTIC (May 10, 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/05/how-to-fight-revenge-porn/275759/. 
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In response, some legislators, believing perhaps that tort law is 
inadequate and seeking to up the ante on whoever posts such images, 
have sought to make the practice a crime. In 2004, New Jersey 
enacted a statute making it a crime to take or distribute a photograph 
of someone else, without his or her consent, when that person was 
involved in sexual activity or if her “intimate parts” were exposed.42 
Other states have passed similar legislation or are considering doing 
so.43 
Criminalizing revenge porn could be a powerful deterrent, 
keeping future women from becoming potential victims. But a victim 
cannot file criminal charges against an ex-partner or compel the 
government to do so.44 A criminal prosecution also does not offer 
past or future victims compensation for their injuries. Some victims 
may want to use a tort suit to recover damages or perhaps just to feel 
vindicated. 
The provenance of revenge porn and victims’ efforts to obtain 
relief from the injuries suffered through this practice highlight some 
of the opportunities and dangers of the Internet. On the one hand, the 
Internet democratizes political debate by allowing everyone to 
express a viewpoint to a wide audience, a privilege previously 
available only to newspaper or magazine publishers and radio or 
television station owners. On the other hand, the opportunity poses 
the risk that false, inflammatory, or tortious speech can circulate not 
only widely but also potentially forever, because the Internet does 
not have intermediaries—editors, publishers, and so forth—to screen 
out unfounded, undesirable, or juvenile speech. What is more, 
speakers can express themselves while remaining anonymous and 
therefore, unlike traditional media entities, unaccountable.45 
Congress likely did not foresee that problem in 1996 when it passed 
section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Various 
commentators have criticized that law on the ground that it 
 
 42. See infra notes 143–47 and accompanying text. 
 43. See infra notes 145–57 and accompanying text; Trevor Hughes, Aim, Shoot, Regret: 
States Move to Ban ‘Revenge Porn’, USA TODAY, May 8, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story 
/news/nation/2014/05/08/states-banning-revenge-porn/8770141/. 
 44. Prosecutors have discretion to select which cases to prosecute as long as they do not rely 
on an invidious or irrational factor, such as race. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 
456, 464 (1996). 
 45. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, The Internet’s Anonymity Problem, in THE OFFENSIVE 
INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND REPUTATION, supra note 8, at 51–65. 
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immunizes far more conduct—such as defamation, harassment, 
bullying, and the like—than Congress intended and that the statute 
should permit the same notice-and-takedown procedure currently 
available to copyright holders46 or should impose liability on 
recalcitrant websites.47 To date, however, Congress has not yet seen 
fit to accept any of those suggestions. 
Yet, there may already be opportunities for relief under state law 
that victims have not fully exploited. That is the burden of this 
Article. The problem of revenge porn is not only an important one, 
but also is one that could not have arisen until the Internet came on 
stream. Like other technological developments that have the 
potential to benefit or harm residents of contemporary society 
(railroads, motor vehicles, aircraft, and pharmaceuticals come to 
mind), the Internet poses new challenges for tort, contract, and 
criminal law. The courts should consider whether the Internet’s 
ability to inflict massive and permanent reputational and 
psychological harm on someone for a mistaken judgment—or worse, 
betrayal—requires that old doctrines be modified to account for this 
new harm. The states can shape tort, contract, and criminal law to 
accommodate new technologies and the new injuries they can inflict. 
Part II argues that state law ought to recognize a civil or criminal 
remedy for the betrayal of trust that discloses highly intimate 
information or images. Part II.A discusses contract law as a 
background to tort and criminal law. Part II.B analyzes state tort law. 
Part II.C summarizes the new state laws making revenge porn a 
crime. The conclusion of Part II is that state law can and should 
provide redress to victims. Part III then shows why the First 
Amendment Free Speech Clause does not foreclose recognizing a 
civil or criminal remedy for revenge porn. 
 
 46. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012). 
 47. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Internet Defamation as Profit Center: The Monetization of Online 
Harassment, 32 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 383 (2009); Levmore & Nussbaum, supra note 45, at 51, 
64–65; Solove, supra note 8, at 24–27; Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of 
Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293 (2011); Bradley A. Areheart, Regulating 
Cyberbullies Through Notice-Based Liability, YALE L.J.F. (Sep. 9, 2007), http://www 
.yalelawjournal.org/forum/regulating-cyberbullies-through-notice-based-liability; Nancy Kim, 
Imposing Tort Liability on Websites for Cyber-Harassment, YALE L.J.F. (Dec. 15, 2008), 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/imposing-tort-liability-on-websites-for-cyber-harassment. 
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II.  STATE LAW 
Tort law is a natural starting point for someone seeking relief 
from revenge porn.48 A tort action for damages is the traditional 
 
 48. Copyright law might be another potential source of relief. See Levendowski, supra note 
22, at 439–46. Copyright law, however, tells a good news–bad news story. 
The good news: The English common law appeared to recognize a nonstatutory right to 
copyright protection as long as a book was not “published to the world,” although the matter is 
not free from doubt. See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657 (1834). Regardless of 
whether the common law recognized a cause of action, Parliament eventually did. See Statute of 
Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710). Of course, photography did not exist at common law, but once it 
came on stream Congress amended the copyright laws in order to protect photographs and films. 
See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540 (recognizing a copyright in a photograph); 
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56–58 (1884); Mitchell Bros. Film Group 
v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 854 (5th Cir. 1979) (recognizing copyright in an 
“obscene” film); Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Time 
Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 141–44 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (ruling that the Zapruder 
film of the Kennedy assassination is protected by copyright); Jewelers’ Circular Publ’g Co. v. 
Keystone Publ’g Co., 274 F. 932, 934–35 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (Learned Hand, J.), aff’d, 281 F. 83 
(2d Cir. 1922); cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (commercial 
illustration protected). Copyright law still protects photographs and films today. See 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 101, 102(a)(5) (2006) (“photographs” are protected as being “pictoral, graphic, and sculptural 
works”); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 683, 712–26 (2012) (discussing development of photograph protection). Finally, while 
copyright law may protect potentially obscene images, see Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 
406 (9th Cir. 1982); Mitchell Bros., 604 F.2d at 854–58, nudity is not per se obscene, see Jenkins 
v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (holding that “nudity alone is not enough to make material 
legally obscene” under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)). 
The bad news: Federal law preempts any state common-law copyright action. Copyright 
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 301, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified, as amended, at 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2006)); see Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Unification: A Cheerful Requiem for Common Law Copyright, 
24 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1010 (1977). A victim of revenge porn therefore is unlikely to prevail on a 
common-law copyright theory; her only remedy would rest on federal law. The Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 created a “notice and takedown” procedure to enable 
copyright holders to demand that internet service providers take down copyrighted images whose 
publication is unlawful. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012). But that remedy forces the subject of 
revenge porn to find every website and ask it for relief. If the person who posted the image 
repeatedly posts it at websites that deal exclusively with revenge porn, the subject is forced to 
play a game of “Whack-a-Mole” and snuff out every instance of publication. Statutory damages 
are available under the Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 
1999, Pub. L. No. 106-160, 113 Stat. 1774 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012)), 
but if the website owner is “judgment proof,” damages are ineffective. See Laird, supra note 25 
(“‘The general rule is that these people are not wealthy,’ [attorney John] Morgan says. ‘They’re 
young men and they think it’s funny.’”). Some websites are overseas and do not recognize United 
States copyright law, leaving a victim with no copyright remedy. See Levendowski, supra note 
22, at 443–45; Laird, supra note 25; Martinez, supra note 25, at 247. The No Electronic Theft Act 
of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2012)), authorizes up 
to ten years’ imprisonment for certain copyright violations, but the victim cannot force the Justice 
Department to prosecute the responsible party. Finally, there is the risk, known as the “Streisand 
effect,” that seeking relief may increase awareness of the privacy violation. See Levendowski, 
supra note 22, at 444 & n.120. 
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vehicle for relief in American law,49 and the common law 
historically has allowed an injured party to recover not only for 
physical injuries or economic losses, but also for assaults on one’s 
reputation or the invasion of one’s privacy.50 At least four different 
torts—namely, invasion of privacy, “false light” portrayal, 
defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress—might 
allow a party to seek damages for injury to her good name and 
standing in the community.51 Other commentators also have 
recommended that tort law can and should provide a remedy for a 
breach of an express or implied assurance of confidentiality in 
connection with otherwise private information.52 
 
There may also be another avenue of relief under federal law. Under section 5(a) of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, the FTC has the authority to seek civil relief against parties who 
use “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce” or “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). On January 29, 2015, the FTC 
announced that it had entered into a settlement agreement with Craig Brittain over activities 
related to his revenge porn website. According to the FTC’s press release, the FTC’s complaint 
alleged that Brittain had violated section 5 because “he used deception to acquire and post 
intimate images of women, then referred them to another website he controlled, where they were 
told they could have the pictures removed if they paid hundreds of dollars.” FTC, “Website 
Operator Banned from the ‘Revenge Porn’ Business After FTC Charges He Unfairly Posted Nude 
Photos” (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/01/website-operator 
-banned-revenge-porn-business-after-ftc-charges. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, 
Brittain must “permanently delete all of the images and other personal information he received 
during the time he operated the site,” he is “prohibited from publicly sharing intimate videos or 
photographs of people without their affirmative express consent,” and he is “prohibited from 
misrepresenting how he will use any personal information he collects online.” Id. Revenge porn 
victims may be able to petition the FTC to pursue the same relief against other parties who 
engage in that conduct. 
 49. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971) 
(“[D]amages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in 
liberty.”). 
 50. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 113, at 797–802; id. § 117, at 856–66; 
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2010). 
 51. Each tort requires publication of defamatory or embarrassing material. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977); KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 113, at 
797–802 (discussing publication requirement for defamation); id. § 117, at 856–66 (same, for 
privacy claim). 
 52. See, e.g., Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for 
Invasion of Privacy, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1995); G. Michael Harvey, Comment, Confidentiality: 
A Measured Response to the Failure of Privacy, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2385 (1995); Jessica Litman, 
Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1308–11 (2000); 
Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationships Privacy Through Implied 
Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887 (2006); Neal M. Richards & Daniel J. 
Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123 (2007); 
Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426 
(1982). Contra Steven A. Bibas, A Contractual Approach to Data Privacy, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 591, 606–11 (1994) (arguing in favor of express privacy contracts). Of course, not 
everyone agrees with that proposition. See, e.g., Dianne L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a 
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Yet, before discussing the availability of a tort action, it would 
be worthwhile to discuss a different common law doctrine: contract 
law. Although it may seem odd at first blush to consider whether a 
victim of revenge porn can seek relief in contract law, in fact, 
contract law principles offer a helpful background to a discussion of 
tort law. 
A.  State Contract Law: Express or Implied  
Agreements and Promissory Estoppel 
Contract law seeks to promote voluntary, mutually beneficial 
exchanges of goods or services by providing a remedy for broken 
promises.53 Contract law recognizes that tacit agreements, promises, 
or assurances can bind the promisor.54 According to the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, “A promise is a manifestation of intention to 
act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a 
promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.”55 A 
promise can be oral or written, express or implied; the legal effect is 
the same.56 
An important decision in this regard is the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.57 Dan Cohen was 
associated with a particular gubernatorial candidate, and he wanted 
to provide information to the Minneapolis Star & Tribune newspaper 
about a rival. Cohen wished to remain anonymous and gave the 
 
Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291 
(1983). 
 53. See, e.g., Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595 (1897); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 
1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 54. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1981); id. § 2 cmt. a (“Like 
‘contract’ however, the word ‘promise’ is commonly and quite properly also used to refer to the 
complex of human relations which results from the promisor’s words or acts of assurance, 
including the justified expectations of the promisee and any moral or legal duty which arises to 
make good the assurance by performance. The performance may be specified either in terms 
describing the action of the promisor or in terms of the result which that action or inaction is to 
bring about.”); id. § 3 (“An agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or 
more persons.”). 
 55. Id. § 2. 
 56. Id. § 4 (“A promise may be stated in words either oral or written, or may be inferred 
wholly or partly from conduct.”); id. § 4 cmt. a (“Express and implied contracts. Contracts are 
often spoken of as express or implied. The distinction involves, however, no difference in legal 
effect, but lies merely in the mode of manifesting assent. Just as assent may be manifested by 
words or other conduct, sometimes including silence, so intention to make a promise may be 
manifested in language or by implication from other circumstances, including course of dealing 
or usage of trade or course of performance.”). 
 57. 457 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1990), rev’d on free speech grounds, 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
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newspaper information in return for its assurance of confidentiality. 
After receiving the information, however, the newspaper identified 
Cohen as the source. Cohen lost his job and sued the newspaper for 
damages.58 
The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that Cohen could not 
establish a breach-of-contract claim. As the court explained, “The 
law . . . does not create a contract where the parties intended none,” 
and the law does not “consider binding every exchange of 
promises.”59 A journalist’s promise to a source that her identity will 
remain secret is more a “moral commitment” or an “‘I’ll-scratch-
your-back-if-you’ll-scratch-mine’ accommodation” than it is “a 
legally binding contract.”60 It would be artificial to treat such an 
arrangement as a contract, the court concluded, because doing so 
places “an unwanted legal rigidity on a special ethical 
relationship.”61 The court nonetheless concluded that Cohen could 
state a claim under the common law of promissory estoppel: 
The doctrine of promissory estoppel implies a contract in 
law where none exists in fact. According to the doctrine, 
well-established in this state, a promise expected or 
reasonably expected to induce definite action by the 
promisee that does induce action is binding if injustice can 
be avoided only by enforcing the promise.62  
Despite approving that theory, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled 
against Cohen on the ground that allowing him to recover damages 
would violate the First Amendment Free Speech Clause. That court 
therefore entered judgment in the media defendant’s favor.63 The 
Supreme Court of the United States later reversed that judgment, and 
its decision is discussed below. For now, however, the important 
point is that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision allows a 
plaintiff to recover damages under a promissory estoppel theory for a 
broken promise of confidentiality. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
endorsed a similar theory in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.64 In that case, a 
 
 58. 457 N.W.2d at 200–02. 
 59. Id. at 203. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 203–04. 
 63. Id. at 205. 
 64. 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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victim of revenge porn sued Yahoo! for damages for its failure to 
remove compromising pictures of her that a Yahoo! employee had 
agreed to remove from its website. The Ninth Circuit ruled that 
Yahoo! could not be sued in tort because, under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996,65 Yahoo! could not be deemed 
“the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”66 The court suggested, however, that 
a plaintiff might be able to bring an action against a company like 
Yahoo! under section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,67 
which recognizes a cause of action for promissory estoppel, a theory 
that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 would not foreclose.68 
Under “the so-called ‘promissory nature’ of contract” law, the courts 
enforce private bargains “because the parties manifest, ex ante, their 
mutual desire that each be able to call upon a judicial remedy if the 
other should breach.”69 Enforcing such an agreement would not 
trespass on the interests that the federal telecommunications laws 
seek to protect, the Barnes court reasoned, because contract law 
deals with bilateral agreement, not unilateral actions. “In a 
promissory estoppel case, as in any other contract case, the duty the 
defendant allegedly violated springs from a contract—an enforceable 
promise—not from any non-contractual conduct or capacity of the 
defendant.”70 
Cowles Media and Barnes are important decisions. Aware of 
need to make a tradeoff between privacy and free speech interests, 
each court treated the promissory estoppel doctrine, a cousin to 
contract law, in a flexible manner as extending beyond an ordinary 
commercial relationship. Each court also was willing to allow a 
plaintiff to obtain relief for the breach of an informal assurance of 
 
 65. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
 66. Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1105–06. 
 67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) provides as follows: 
§ 90 Promise Reasonably Inducing Action or Forbearance 
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or 
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such 
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires. 
(2) A charitable subscription or a marriage settlement is binding under Subsection (1) 
without proof that the promise induced action or forbearance. 
 68. See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1107. 
 69. Id. at 1106. 
 70. Id. at 1107. 
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confidentiality. And each court made it clear that, even though a 
plaintiff could not maintain an ordinary contract action, given the 
unusual nature of the agreement at stake, all was not lost, because a 
related state–common law doctrine was available to provide relief for 
someone who was the victim of a broken promise. Those points will 
become more significant after viewing this issue from the 
perspective of tort law.  
B.  State Tort Law: Privacy-Related Torts 
1.  The Available Tort Theories 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote the classic article on 
privacy in 1890, describing it as a right of autonomy, “the right ‘to 
be let alone.’”71 In the century-plus since then, privacy has taken on 
so many additional characteristics that the term has become all but 
indefinable.72 The contemporary concept of “privacy” has an 
expansive, protean, and (perhaps therefore) indistinct boundary.73 
There is agreement that, whatever its confines, privacy is valuable 
both inherently74 and instrumentally.75 Beyond that, however, the 
 
 71. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
195 (1890). 
 72. See, e.g., ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 25 (1971) (lamenting that the 
concept of “privacy is difficult to define because it is exasperatingly vague and evanescent”). 
 73. The literature on the subject is enormous. For a sample of government and private 
publications discussing the historical, theoretical, practical, and comparative aspects of the 
subject, see, for example, FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA 
OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012); SEC’Y’S 
ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED DATA SYS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, 
RECORDS, COMPUTERS & THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973); HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN 
CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2010); ALAN F. 
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Patricia Sanchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a 
Spaceless World, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2007); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 
(1968); Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 (2000); Jed 
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989); Symposium, Privacy and 
Technology, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880 (2012); Symposium, Privacy and Big Data: Making Ends 
Meet, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 25 (2013); James Q. Whitman, Two Western Cultures of 
Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004). 
 74. See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 1–38. 
 75. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 73, at 477–78 (“It is my thesis that privacy is not just one 
possible means among others to insure some other value, but that it is necessarily related to ends 
and relations of the most fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship and trust. Privacy is not 
merely a good technique for furthering these fundamental relations; rather without privacy they 
are simply inconceivable. They require a context of privacy or the possibility of privacy for their 
existence. To make clear the necessity of privacy as a context for respect, love, friendship and 
trust is to bring out also why a threat to privacy seems to threaten our very integrity as persons. 
To respect, love, trust, feel affection for others and to regard ourselves as the objects of love, trust 
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concept may have as many meanings as there are authors attempting 
to define it.76 
The law deals with the concrete problems of real people, 
however, so it must generate some usable definition of a term like 
“privacy” if the law is to serve its social ordering function. The 
common law did just that. Tort scholar William Prosser offered the 
first practical definition of “privacy.” In his view, tort law protects 
four separate interests that fall under that generic label: (1) intrusion 
into a person’s seclusion, (2) public disclosure of embarrassing facts, 
(3) publicity that places an individual in a “false light” to the public, 
and (4) appropriation of a person’s likeness.77 The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, for which Prosser was the reporter, adopted that 
four-part framework.78  
The posting of revenge porn directly trespasses on the second 
and third interests Prosser identified.79 It discloses photographs that 
 
and affection is at the heart of our notion of ourselves as persons among persons, and privacy is 
the necessary atmosphere for these attitudes and actions, as oxygen is for combustion.”). 
 76. See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 51, at 1–38. The Supreme Court has not done a better job 
than the academy in this regard. The Court has decided a fairly sizeable number of cases by 
invoking or adverting to “privacy” without explaining from whence that term comes in the 
Constitution or how it can be defined objectively. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003) (the Due Process Clause and same-sex intimate activities); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 
(1977) (the Due Process Clause and medical information); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
(the Due Process Clause and abortion); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1969) (the Fourth 
Amendment and law enforcement searches); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (the 
Due Process Clause and regulation of contraceptives); id. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting) (stating 
that privacy is “a broad, abstract, and ambiguous concept”). 
 77. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
 78. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2) (1977) (“The right of privacy is 
invaded by (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in § 652B; or (b) 
appropriation of the other’s name or likeness, as stated in § 652(C); or (c) unreasonable publicity 
given to the other’s private life, as stated in § 652(D); or (d) publicity that unreasonably places 
the other in a false light before the public, as stated in § 652E.”). 
 79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (“One who gives publicity to a 
matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his 
privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.”); id. § 652E (“One who gives publicity 
to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to 
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in 
reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other 
would be placed.”). 
The other two privacy tort theories would not apply to revenge porn. The essence of 
revenge porn is publication of intimate photographs however acquired, not a trespass or the 
intrusion into a zone of privacy. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 
1968) (intrusion into the home); Newcomb Hotel Co. v. Corbett, 108 S.E. 309 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1921) (intrusion into a hotel). The first prong of the Prosser and Restatement typology therefore 
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are inherently embarrassing and places a person in a “false light” by 
giving a degrading or distorted image of the person involved, one 
falsely suggestive of promiscuity.80 
In addition to the four tort theories that Prosser recognized, there 
may also be two other tort claims available to a revenge porn victim. 
One is defamation. The essence of defamation is “the idea of 
disgrace”—that is, the defendant, either through the written or 
spoken word, has besmirched the plaintiff’s good name and 
reputation.81 The argument would be that revenge porn damages both 
interests by intentionally misportraying the victim as libertine. The 
other theory is the intentional infliction of emotional distress.82 That 
tort affords relief not for the minor incivilities that (unfortunately) 
are part of everyday life—the law expects us to be made of sterner 
 
does not apply. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmts. b & c (1977). An ex-
partner posts revenge porn to humiliate the subject, not to make a profit or benefit in some other 
tangible way. Accordingly, the privacy tort for appropriation of a person’s likeness also would 
not apply. It requires proof of some benefit to the person making the publication, and the psychic 
pleasure from vengeance would not qualify. See id. § 652C cmts. b & c. 
 80. See, e.g., Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1082–84 (9th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff 
stated a claim for a “false light” privacy violation when magazine placed a partially nude 
photograph of him on the cover and suggested that he had posed nude for the magazine); 
Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1134–40 (7th Cir. 1986) (ruling that plaintiff 
could state a “false light” defamation claim for magazine’s publication of naked photos of her 
obtained by virtue of a forged consent form); Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 134–41 
(2d Cir. 1984) (ruling that magazine’s use of plaintiff’s name next to the picture of a nude woman 
stated a “false light” privacy claim, but holding in defendant’s favor on First Amendment 
grounds); Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1089–93 (5th Cir. 1984) (upholding 
“false light” defamation judgment for plaintiffs for magazine’s publication of stolen naked photos 
given to the magazine under a forged consent form). Contra Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 
(1967) (reversing a jury award of damages for portraying hostages in a false light). 
 81. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (“A communication is 
defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the 
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.”); KEETON ET AL., 
supra note 14, at 773 (“Defamation is . . . that which tends to injure ‘reputation’ in the popular 
sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, good-will or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to 
excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 82. See Daniel Zharkovsky, Note, “If Man Will Strike, Strike Through the Mask”: Striking 
Through Section 230 Defenses Using the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 44 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 193 (2010) (arguing that the Communications Decency Act does not 
bar such a tort case brought against an internet service provider); cf. Catherine E. Smith, 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: An Old Arrow Targets the Head of the New Hate 
Hydra, 80 DENVER U. L. REV. 1 (2002) (arguing in favor of using that tort to respond to cyber-
harassment). 
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stuff—but for truly “outrageous conduct, of a kind especially 
calculated to cause serious mental and emotional disturbance.”83  
A victim of revenge porn should be able to satisfy the elements 
of each of those last two torts. Posting a photograph on the Internet 
would constitute “publication.”84 Moreover, a reasonable person 
would find extremely offensive the nonconsensual online posting of 
intimate photographs of a former wife or girlfriend, especially when 
done for the purpose of revenge.85 Mark Twain eloquently described 
the injury that can result from the disclosure of intimate information 
when he wrote about the unconsented-to publication of a love letter: 
The frankest and freest and privatest part of the human 
mind and heart is a love letter; the writer gets his limitless 
freedom of statement and expression from his sense that no 
stranger is going to see what he is writing. Sometimes there 
is a breach-of-promise case by and by; and when he sees his 
letter in print it makes him cruelly uncomfortable and he 
 
 83. William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. 
REV. 874, 879 (1939). The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the tort of “outrageous conduct 
causing severe emotional distress” as follows: 
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes 
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, 
and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm. 
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if 
he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress (a) to a member of such 
person’s immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not such distress 
results in bodily harm, or (b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such 
distress results in bodily harm. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977). 
 84. Recently, a German court saw no need for publication in a potential revenge porn case. 
A person in a relationship had intimate images of his former partner. The court ruled that the 
person with the images had to delete the photographs once the relationship ended, even if he had 
no intent to publish them. See Philip Oltermann, ‘Revenge Porn’ Victims Receive Boost From 
German Court Ruling, GUARDIAN (May 22, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014 
/may/22/revenge-porn-victims-boost-german-court-ruling. American courts have not gone that far 
and may never. 
 85. See, e.g., Vassiliades v. Garfinckle’s, Inc., 492 A.2d 580, 588 (D.C. 1985) (ruling that 
the public disclosure of before and after photographs of someone who had a face lift can be 
actionable); KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, at 857 (“The ordinary reasonable person does not 
take offense at mention in a newspaper of the fact that he has returned home from a visit, or gone 
camping in the woods, or given a party at his house for his friends. It is quite a different matter 
when the details of sexual relations are spread before the public eye, or there is highly personal 
portrayal of his intimate private characteristics or conduct.” (footnotes omitted)); supra notes 26–
28 (collecting cases); cf. Lewis v. LeGrow, 670 N.W.2d 675, 685 (Mich. App. 2003) (“There is a 
vast difference between knowingly exposing oneself to one’s partner during consensual sex and 
having that intimate event secretly photographed, and thus, captured and preserved for all time.” 
(citation and internal punctuation omitted)). 
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perceives that he never would have unbosomed himself to 
that large and honest degree if he had known that he was 
writing for the public.86 
The stories told by victims of revenge porn establish that this 
practice causes precisely the type of emotional harm for which those 
last two torts—defamation and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress—seek to provide compensation.87 Given that revenge porn 
involves the posting of a photograph on the Internet, which is 
available worldwide, not just to a newspaper’s readership in a local 
community, revenge porn likely would have an even more 
distressing impact on a victim.88 In sum, the online posting of 
revenge porn would seem to be an eminently suitable example of 
outrageous conduct for which one or more of the above tort theories 
should provide relief. 
2.  The Likely Defense 
Nonetheless, it might be difficult for a victim of revenge porn 
ultimately to prevail under any of the above theories. Consent would 
 
 86. MARK TWAIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARK TWAIN xxxv (Charles Neider ed. 1990); 
cf. Richards & Solove, supra note 52, at 126 (“The law of confidentiality in England also has 
attributes that the American privacy torts lack. In America, the prevailing belief is that people 
assume the risk of betrayal when they share secrets with each other. But in England, spouses, ex-
spouses, friends, and nearly anyone else can be liable for divulging confidences. As one English 
court noted, ‘when people kiss and later one of them tells, that second person is almost certainly 
breaking a confidential arrangement.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 87. See supra notes 26–28. 
 88. The effect might be especially harmful to a woman. See Mollie Brunworth, How Women 
Are Ruining Their Reputations Online: Privacy in the Internet Age, 5 CHARLESTON L. REV. 581, 
597–98, 603 (2011) (“From a gendered perspective, a double standard still persists where women 
are judged more harshly for their sexual behavior than their male counterparts. . . . When a 
woman makes the morning trek back to the dorm after the previous night’s hookup, it’s dubbed 
the ‘walk of shame.’ For men, it’s the ‘stride of pride.’” (footnotes and citation omitted)); 
Chander, supra note 25, at 129 (arguing that the public disclosure of nude photographs is more 
damaging to women than men because women are more often the victims of this practice and 
society has allowed men more sexual latitude than women, a form of “Boys will be boys” 
mentality). The Restatement (Second) of Torts also offers an instructive hypothetical: 
A is invited to a swimming party at an exclusive resort. B gives her a bathing suit 
which he knows will dissolve in water. It does dissolve while she is swimming, leaving 
her naked in the presence of men and women whom she has just met. A suffers 
extreme embarrassment, shame, and humiliation. B is subject to liability to A for her 
emotional distress. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. D, illus. 3 (1977). The illustration is not identical 
to the revenge porn scenario, because the woman above never appeared naked until after her 
swim suit disintegrated. The hypothetical does make the point, however, that the unexpected, 
nonconsensual disclosure of one’s naked body to the world can be humiliating. 
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be a complete defense to a claimed invasion of privacy or intentional 
tort.89 That would defeat any such theory here, a defendant would 
argue, because the victim originally consented to having the picture 
taken—by definition if it was a “selfie.” Moreover, we always take 
the risk that once we disclose a secret to another that he will betray 
our confidence. As Benjamin Franklin warned, “Three can keep a 
secret if two of them are dead.”90 Truth also is a defense to a claim of 
defamation,91 as well as to a claim that the publication depicted the 
victim in a false light.92 Pictures don’t lie, the argument would go; 
they merely represent what the photographer saw through the 
viewfinder. While the pictures may be unflattering and the 
photographer’s state of mind may have been malicious, the argument 
would conclude, photographs truthfully reveal exactly who the 
victim was and how she appeared to the camera.93  
 
 89. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652F cmt. b (1977) (“[C]onsent to any 
publication, either of matter that is personally defamatory or of matter that invades privacy, 
creates an absolute privilege so long as the publication does not exceed the scope of the 
consent.”); KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, at 867 (“It is reasonably clear that consent to particular 
conduct will prevent that conduct from constituting an actual invasion. It may be given expressly 
or by conduct, such as posing for a picture with knowledge of the purposes for which it is to be 
used, or industrially seeking publicity of the same kind” (footnotes omitted)); SOLOVE, supra 
note 50, at 102. A plaintiff could argue that she gave consent only to the taking and keeping of 
the picture. That argument is a reasonable one, but that theory is better addressed through a 
separate tort for betrayal. 
 90. BRAINYQUOTE, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/b/benjaminfr162078.html 
(last visited Aug. 21, 2014). Literature makes that point best. See WILLIAM CONGREVE, LOVE 
FOR LOVE 48 (Malcolm Kelsall ed. 1999) (1695) (“O fie, miss, you must not kiss and tell.”); 
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ALL’S WELL THAT ENDS WELL act 1, sc. 1, lines 61–62 (Arthur E. 
Cage, ed., Yale University Press 1926) (“Love all, trust a few, do wrong to none.”). Supreme 
Court Fourth Amendment decisions could be read to support that conclusion. See infra notes 
136–41 and accompanying text. 
 91. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 52, at 306–20. The common law placed on the 
defendant the burden of proving the truth of a statement. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, 
at 841 (“Out of a tender regard for reputations, the [common] law presumes in the first instance 
that all defamation is false, and the defendant has the burden of pleading and proving its truth.” 
(footnote omitted)); see id. at 839–40. Since the Supreme Court’s decision in N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), it now generally is the plaintiff’s burden to establish that a 
statement is false. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, at 839–40. 
 92. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 253 n.5 (1974) (reversing a 
jury award of damages for a “false light” claim against a photographer on the ground that the 
photograph accurately represented what was photographed). 
 93. See Levendowski, supra note 22, at 436–37 (concluding that courts may be reluctant to 
find that a person has a privacy claim for any image consensually taken and distributed); cf. 
Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy 12 GA. L. REV. 392, 395 (1978) (arguing that the right to 
control information about us is tantamount to “a right to misrepresent one’s character”); Harvey 
L. Zuckman, Invasion of Privacy—Some Communicative Torts Whose Time Has Gone, 47 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 253, 260 (1990) (“While no doubt persons embarrassed by publicity [of an aspect 
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The possible inadequacy of traditional tort law principles to 
provide relief for a victim of revenge porn, however, should not end 
the analysis. Contemporary tort law is the result of a centuries-long 
process of judicial and legislative adaptation of the common law to 
meet new and expanding societal needs.94 Tort law historically has 
enabled private parties to invoke the judicial process to seek 
compensation for injuries suffered due to the fault of another through 
means other than a breach of contract.95 Early at common law, the 
law of torts was concerned simply with maintaining the peace of the 
community by bribing the victims of injurious conduct—such as 
assault or battery, which were treated as a form of trespass96—not to 
retaliate against a responsible party.97 The interests protected by tort 
law have expanded over time. They now range over the entire 
 
of their private lives] would prefer ‘to be let alone,’ their interest in presenting a false or 
incomplete image to others is not one that seems very compelling.”). 
 94. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 253–54 (1952) (“The industrial 
revolution multiplied the number of workmen exposed to injury from increasingly powerful and 
complex mechanisms, driven by freshly discovered sources of energy, requiring higher 
precautions by employers. Traffic of velocities, volumes and varieties unheard of came to subject 
the wayfarer to intolerable casualty risks if owners and drivers were not to observe new cares and 
uniformities of conduct. Congestion of cities and crowding of quarters called for health and 
welfare regulations undreamed of in simpler times. Wide distribution of goods became an 
instrument of wide distribution of harm when those who dispersed food, drink, drugs, and even 
securities, did not comply with reasonable standards of quality, integrity, disclosure and care. 
Such dangers have engendered increasingly numerous and detailed regulations which heighten 
the duties of those in control of particular industries, trades, properties or activities that affect 
public health, safety or welfare.”); Second Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 49–51 (1912) 
(upholding congressional repeal of the fellow-servant rule); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. 
Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 295–96 (1908) (holding an employer liable to injuries caused by its 
violation of a legislatively-imposed safety requirement must bear the costs of an accident); JOHN 
G. FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 194 (2d ed. 1985) (“Understandably the 
law’s primary concern is with protecting individuals’ interests of substance by assuring recovery 
for personal injury and property damage. But man does not live on bread alone. Increasing 
sophistication has, with the advance of civilization, fostered demands for extending legal 
protection to non-material interests of personality like self-respect, reputation, and privacy.”); 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, at 572–73; William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 
YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). 
 95. See, e.g., FLEMING, supra note 94, at 1; KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, at 1–7. As Oliver 
Wendell Holmes put it, “[t]he business of the law of torts is to fix the dividing lines between 
those cases in which a man is liable for harm which he has done, and those in which he is not.” 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 54 (1881). 
 96. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, at 29–30. 
 97. See, e.g., FLEMING, supra note 94, at 2 (“The law of torts was . . . for quite a long time 
little more than a shadow in the wake of criminal law, concerned with the grosser delicts which 
almost always have consisted in some form of intentional aggression rather than accidental 
harm.” (emphasis in original)); HOLMES, supra note 95, at 73–74; THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, 
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 422–23, 455, 458–65 (5th ed. 1956). 
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landscape of personal, professional, and business concerns and allow 
injured parties to recover, for example, for physical injuries due to 
automobile accidents, economic loss suffered by a business due to 
unfair means of competition, and psychological harms suffered by 
tortious actions damaging a person’s privacy or reputation.98 
Revenge porn is just a new way of damaging interests already 
deemed worthy of protection by contemporary tort law. 
At the end of the day, the question is not whether tort law 
currently offers relief for revenge porn; the question is whether it 
should. The answer is “Yes.” 
3.  The Importance of Betrayal 
American privacy law has not generally focused on recovery for 
breach of a promise of confidentiality. The reason is three-fold: the 
breach of an assurance of confidentiality sounds more in contract 
than tort, Prosser did not identify that conduct as one of the four 
interests a privacy-invasion tort would protect, and the Supreme 
Court has expansively construed the First Amendment Free Speech 
Clause to enable publication of most information that has been 
lawfully obtained and that relates to a matter of public interest.99 
Recently, however, several scholars have argued that tort law should 
protect a person’s interest in being able to share private thoughts, 
words, or actions with an intimate partner without the fear that they 
will later be disclosed to the world. Their argument is that tort law 
should protect against a later nonconsensual disclosure of any 
information or photographs exchanged between intimate partners. 
Those scholars have added that the First Amendment does not 
foreclose tort relief for what lawyers would call the breach of an 
 
 98. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 252–54 (1974) (upholding a 
jury award of damages against a journalist and his employer for a “false light” privacy claim); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977) (defamation); id. at §§ 652A(c) & 652D 
(unreasonable publicity given to someone’s private life); FLEMING, supra note 94, at 195–214 
(discussing common law of defamation and invasion of privacy); KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, 
at 771–869 (same). The torts of defamation and invasion of privacy are related, but different. 
“The former [serves] to protect a person’s interest in a good reputation,” while “[t]he latter is to 
protect a person’s interest in being let alone and is available when there has been publicity of a 
kind that is highly offensive.” KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, at 864. 
 99. See, e.g., McClurg, supra note 52, at 896–908. 
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implied-in-fact contract not to reveal confidential information to 
others—and for what a wronged party would call betrayal.100 
Start by considering the competing interests. The privacy and 
reputational interests to be protected clearly are legitimate. More 
than thirty states provide a remedy for the public disclosure of a 
private matter that is highly offensive to a reasonable person.101 
Revenge porn also does not contribute to political debate or to any 
issue of public interest; on the contrary, revenge porn is highly 
offensive, even sleazy. Finally, it would be difficult to argue that 
revenge porn is a legitimate, let alone necessary, mode of self-
expression. One need not subscribe to the belief that revenge should 
be left to the Almighty102 in order to conclude that revenge porn is a 
shoddy form of speech that contributes nothing to the community’s 
discussion of any issue of public importance and that expresses little 
more than a mean-spirited mindset and desire to inflict reputational 
harm on a former intimate partner. In fact, it is only the victim’s trust 
in her partner not to display the photograph to the world that could 
keep her from being able to prevail under a standard invasion of 
privacy theory. Yet, that fact also shows us what should be the 
critical issue in any debate over the use of tort law to compensate 
victims of revenge porn: betrayal. 
Betrayal is the key to the proper legal analysis of revenge porn. 
The essence of revenge porn is the Internet-posting of nude 
photographs of a former intimate partner for the purpose of 
subjecting her to public humiliation. That conduct is accomplished, 
however, through a betrayal of the trust that the victim had in her 
partner that he would never publicize the photographs. Online 
posting of the same surreptitiously taken photograph would certainly 
constitute the offensive publication of private details of an 
individual’s life for which the Restatement (Second) of Torts would 
provide a damages remedy.103 The only difference between that 
 
 100. See, e.g., id. at 908–39; Richards & Solove, supra note 52, at 156–58; Vickery, supra 
note 52. 
 101. See Chander, supra note 25, at 129–30. 
 102. See Romans 12:19 (“Beloved, never avenge yourselves, but leave room for the wrath of 
God; for it is written, ‘Vengeance is mine, I will repay, says the Lord.’”). 
 103. See Lewis v. LeGrow, 670 N.W.2d 675 (Mich. App. 2003) (upholding verdict for 
plaintiffs for defendant surreptitiously filming his sexual encounters with them). Witness the 
uproar when someone surreptitiously took videotapes of then-ESPN sportscaster Erin Andrews. 
See Nancy Dillon, ESPN Beauty Erin Andrews Wants Maximum Sentence for Her Convicted 
Stalker Michael Barrett, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 15, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com 
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scenario and the one characteristic of revenge porn is that the person 
who published the photograph violated a tacit agreement between the 
parties over what could be done with it. Taken, yes; possessed, yes; 
publicized, no. The breach of that assurance of confidentiality is 
what tort law should protect. As Professor Daniel Solove has 
explained: 
[D]isclosure and breach of confidentiality cause different 
kinds of injuries. Both involve revealing a person’s secrets, 
but breaches of confidentiality also violate trust in a specific 
relationship. The harm from a breach of confidentiality, 
then, is not simply that information has been disclosed, but 
that the victim has been betrayed.104 
Tort law protection is necessary both to remedy the damage 
done to a victim and to eliminate a risk that parties may feel reluctant 
to find intimacy with someone else. As Professor Andrew McClurg 
has explained: 
We all face the outside world wearing a mask that hides 
part of who and what we are. We withhold fears, dreams, 
regrets, sorrows, fantasies, jealousies, gripes, passions, 
pride, grief, and many other thoughts and emotions, some of 
them beautiful and some of them ugly. Part of intimacy is 
finding someone with whom we feel safe and comfortable 
taking off the mask and being and revealing our true selves. 
Intimacy will remain unattainable so long as intimate 
partners feel compelled to withhold private facts or aspects 
about themselves, measuring everything they say or do out 
of fear that it might be revealed to others.105 
Professor Jeff Rosen agrees: 
If individuals cannot form relationships of trust without fear 
that their confidences will be betrayed, the uncertainty 
about whether or not their most intimate moments are being 
 
/entertainment/gossip/espn-beauty-erin-andrews-maximum-sentence-convicted-stalker-michael-
barrett-article-1.433554. 
 104. SOLOVE, supra note 50, at 138. Of course, some parties have mistakenly publicized such 
photos to a large number of people other than an intended recipient. See Zayda Rivera, Alison Pill 
Recalls Mistakenly Tweeting Topless Photo: ‘It Was a Dumb Thing To Do’, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, 
Sept. 5, 2013, http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/gossip/alison-pill-recalls-mistakenly 
-tweeting-topless-photo-article-1.1446789. In those cases, there would be no act of betrayal, so 
tort law would not provide a remedy if an unintended recipient posted a photograph online. 
 105. McClurg, supra note 52, at 914 (footnotes omitted). 
REVENGE PORN 4/16/2015  5:35 PM 
86 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:57 
recorded for future exposure will make intimacy 
impossible; and without intimacy, there will be no 
opportunity to develop the autonomous, inner-directed self 
that defies social expectations rather than conforms to 
them.106 
The agreement between the parties almost never would be 
express, let alone written. But a contract need not be written to be 
valid and may be implied from the course of dealings between two 
parties.107 In virtually every case involving sexual partners, there 
likely would have been an oral or tacit agreement not to publicize the 
intimate details of their relationship, and either type of assurance is 
entitled to the same binding legal effect as a written nondisclosure 
agreement. To be sure, the absence of a written agreement may make 
it more difficult for a plaintiff to prove that she has been betrayed by 
a former partner. But it should not deny her the opportunity to make 
that showing. 
It also would be unreasonable to conclude that the victim of 
revenge porn cannot claim to retain a privacy or confidentiality 
interest in photographs voluntarily turned over to someone else. 
Why? Because it is a mistake to treat privacy as an all-or-nothing 
decision—that is, to treat information as private or confidential only 
if no one else is aware of it. As Harvard Professor Charles Fried has 
explained, “Privacy is not simply an absence of information about us 
in the minds of others; rather it is the control we have over 
information about ourselves.”108 Society and the law do not force 
that binary choice on us to avoid opening ourselves to the world. Our 
consent to disclose private information to a select group of parties is 
not tantamount to a disclosure to the public at large.109 The law 
 
 106. Jeffrey Rosen, The Purposes of Privacy: A Response, 89 GEO. L.J. 2117, 2123–24 
(2001). 
 107. See supra Part II.A; McClurg, supra note 52, at 916. 
 108. Fried, supra note 73, at 482; see also, e.g., WESTIN, supra note 73, at 7 (“Privacy is the 
claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves, when, how, and to what 
extent information about them is communicated to others.”); McClurg, supra note 52, at 928; 
SOLOVE, supra note 50, at 24–29, 136–48. 
 109. See Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 493–94 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) 
(ruling that a person’s disclosure of his medical condition to family, friends, and support group 
does not forfeit a claim of privacy when the defendant disclosed the condition to the public at 
large); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 
(2005) (arguing that social network theory can justify treating as private information disclosed to 
a discrete number of people). The rules governing athletic contests make that point by analogy. 
Football players consent to be blocked or tackled by opposing players, not spectators who decide 
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recognizes that we enter into a variety of arrangements based on an 
assumption of trust and protects exchanges between confidants.110 
We assume that statements made in confidence to a spouse, a 
physician, a lawyer, or a member of the clergy will be held in 
confidence.111 The law gives effect to that understanding through the 
doctrine of privileges112 and by recognizing a tort claim for the 
disclosure of information in violation of an express or implied 
assurance of confidentiality.113 We also assume that letters given to 
the postal service will not be opened and read, a custom supported by 
 
to join in the game. See Laird, supra note 25 (“Just as a boxer hasn’t consented to be punched 
outside the ring, someone who sends a naughty picture to a lover has not consented to have that 
picture distributed online.”). 
 110. See, e.g., Richards & Solove, supra note 52; Solove, supra note 8, at 20; Strahilevitz, 
supra note 109. 
 111. See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 174; Gilles, supra note 52, at 17; id. at 17 n.85 
(collecting cases). 
 112. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (recognizing psychotherapist-patient 
privilege under Fed. R. Evid. 501); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (same, for 
attorney-client privilege); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (same, for spousal 
privilege); Richards & Solove, supra note 52, at 134–35 (explaining that the common law 
protected confidential relationships through evidentiary privileges); see also, e.g., Swidler & 
Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (ruling that the attorney-client privilege protects 
confidential communications between a represented party and his lawyer even after the client’s 
death). 
 113. For example, several courts have held that a physician has an implied duty of 
confidentiality to a patient and that disclosures breaching that duty can be the subject of a 
damages action. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 797 (N.D. 
Ohio 1965); Horne v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 831–32 (Ala. 1974); Bryson v. Tillinghast, 749 
P.2d 110, 113 (Okla. 1988); McCormick v. Eng., 494 S.E.2d 431, 435 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) 
(collecting cases). State courts also have recognized that a bank owes the same duty to its 
depositors. See, e.g., Burrows v. Super. Ct., 529 P.2d 590, 593 (Cal. 1974) (a bank has an implied 
obligation with a depositor not to disclose account information); Rubenstein v. S. Denver Nat’l 
Bank, 762 P.2d 755, 756–57 (Colo. App. 1988) (collecting cases); Barnett Bank of W. Fl. v. W. 
Richard Hooper, 498 So. 2d 923, 925 (Fla. 1986) (a bank generally owes a duty of confidentiality 
to a depositor); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 288–90 (Idaho 1961) (ruling 
that a depositor can sue his bank for the unconsented-to disclosure of her financial information 
based on an implied promise of confidentiality); Ind. Nat’l Bank v. Chapman, 482 N.E.2d 474, 
480 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (a bank has an implied obligation with a depositor not to disclose 
account information); Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408 A.2d 758, 762–64 (Md. App. Spec. 
App. 1979) (same); Richfield Bank & Trust Co. v. Sjogren, 244 N.W.2d 648, 651 (Minn. 1976) 
(same); McGuire v. Shubert, 722 A.2d 1087, 1090–91 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (same); Tournier v. 
Nat’l Provincial & Union Bank of Eng., 1 K.B. 461 (1923) (same); Edward L. Raymond Jr., 
Annotation, Bank’s Liability Under State Law for Disclosing Financial Information Concerning 
Depositor or Customer, 81 A.L.R. 4TH 377 (1990); SOLOVE, supra note 50, at 139–40; Daniel J. 
Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 529 (2006). See generally Richards & 
Solove, supra note 52, at 135–38 (explaining that the common law protected confidential 
relationships through the recognition of confidential relationships such as principal-agent, trustee-
beneficiary, and parent-child). 
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Anglo-American law for more than three centuries.114 Codes of 
ethics115 and modern-day statutes116 supply additional protection for 
certain types of communications that traditionally were governed by 
the common law. The result is that case law and statutes now impose 
a duty of confidentiality on various parties and offer a tort remedy 
for a material breach of that duty.117 
As discussed above, contract law recognizes that tacit 
agreements, promises, or assurances can bind the promisor.118 A 
promise can be oral or written, express or implied; the legal effect is 
the same.119 While contract and tort law generally are distinct legal 
 
 114. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877) (ruling that the Fourth Amendment prohibits 
the federal government from opening a person’s mail without a search warrant); Richards & 
Solove, supra note 52, at 140–45; Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 1892, 1899 (1981) (“Nineteenth century public opinion regarded the ‘sanctity of 
the mails’ as absolute in the same way it esteemed the inviolability of the home.” (footnote 
omitted)). For examples of statutes protecting the confidentiality of such communications, see 
The Post Office (Revenues) Act 1710, 9 Ann., c. 11, § 41; Act of Mar. 3, 1825, ch. 64 § 22, 4 
Stat. 102 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1702 (2012)). 
 115. See, e.g., Oath of Hippocrates, in DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG & PAUL M. 
SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 350 (2d ed. 2006) (“Whatever, in connection with my 
professional service, or not in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not 
to be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all such should be kept secret.”); 
MODEL PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY CODE Canon 4, EC 4-1, 4-4, 4-6 (1980). 
 116. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006); Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (2006); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 
U.S.C. § 2710 (2006); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. 
§1320d-2 (2006). 
 117. As two privacy scholars have put it: 
A plaintiff can establish a breach of confidence action by proving the existence and 
breach of a duty of confidentiality. Courts have found the existence of such a duty by 
looking to the nature of the relationship between the parties, by reference to the law of 
fiduciaries, or by finding an implied contract of confidentiality. Most commonly, the 
breach of confidentiality tort applies to physicians. Courts have also applied it to 
banks, hospitals, insurance companies, psychiatrists, social workers, accountants, 
school officials, attorneys, and employees. Some courts have held that liability under 
the breach of confidentiality tort also extends to “a third party who induces a breach of 
a trustee’s duty of loyalty, or participates in such a breach, or knowingly accepts any 
benefit from such a breach.” 
Richards & Solove, supra note 52, at 157–58 (footnotes omitted). 
 118. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1981) (“A promise is a 
manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a 
promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.”); id. § 2 cmt. a (“Like ‘contract,’ 
however, the word “promise” is commonly and quite properly also used to refer to the complex of 
human relations which results from the promisor’s words or acts of assurance, including the 
justified expectations of the promisee and any moral or legal duty which arises to make good the 
assurance by performance. The performance may be specified either in terms describing the 
action of the promisor or in terms of the result which that action or inaction is to bring about.”); 
id. § 3 (“An agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more persons.”). 
 119. See supra note 56. 
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doctrines addressed to different interests,120 Professors Prosser and 
Keeton have argued that it may be possible for a party to recover 
damages in tort for losses suffered by a broken promise.121 To be 
sure, a breach-of-confidentiality tort is less robust in the United 
States than it is in the English Commonwealth of Nations.122 But 
courts have recognized a breach-of-confidentiality tort for some 
plaintiffs, and it is a reasonable way to deal with the competing 
privacy and free speech interests.123 Accordingly, it would be 
sensible for tort law to offer the victims of revenge porn redress for 
an invasion of privacy if the victim can prove a broken implicit 
promise of confidentiality.124 
Judicial recognition of a tort hinging on proof of betrayal is 
consistent with the historical development of tort law. As the 
Supreme Court has noted, “the common law is not immutable but 
flexible, and by its own principles adapts itself to varying 
conditions.”125 The ability to remain flexible to accommodate 
 
 120. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 1, at 5–6 (noting that “[c]ontract liability is 
imposed by the law for the protection of a single, limited interest, that of having the promises of 
others performed,” while tort liability “is directed toward the compensation of individuals, rather 
than the public, for losses which they have suffered within the scope of their legal-recognized 
interests”). 
 121. Promises induce reliance, and broken promises can force a party to suffer harm from her 
reliance on the promisor’s word. 
When one makes a promise—a commitment as to what he will do or not do in the 
future—this generally induces reasonable reliance thereon, and reliance damage apart 
from benefit of the bargain damage is likely to result. Some courts are likely to hold 
that there is a duty to exercise reasonable care, even if the promise is not enforceable as 
such under contract law, to prevent foreseeable harm to the promisee (as well as to 
third parties) from reasonable reliance on the promisor to carry out the promise as 
made. This is not a duty to perform but rather a duty to prevent reliance damage. Since 
the loss suffered is the result of reliance on a manifested intention, it might be 
preferable to regard the recovery when justified as a type of contractual recovery, 
especially when the claim is by a promisee and not by a third party. But contractual 
liability can be regarded as limited to the type of case where promises are found to be 
enforceable, and the damage results from the breach of an enforceable promise. 
Id. § 92, at 658. 
 122. See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 188; Gilles, supra note 52, at 9–14; Richards & 
Solove, supra note 52, at 158–81. 
 123. See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 190–91. 
 124. Ironically, Professors Richards and Solove have explained that Prosser could have 
incorporated a breach of confidentiality into his four-part typology of privacy set forth in his 1960 
article, his treatise, and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, for which he served as reporter. For 
whatever reason, Prosser chose not to take privacy law in that direction. See Richards & Solove, 
supra note 52, at 151–57. 
 125. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996) (quoting Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 
383 (1933)). 
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evolving personal and social interests is the very strength of the 
common law.126 Over centuries, Anglo-American tort law has 
evolved from the simple needs of a rural, agricultural society to the 
complex demands of an urban, industrial enterprise; from the limited 
need to protect individuals against physical assaults from neighbors 
and other known parties to the desire to protect large classes of 
people from new, potentially hazardous, mass-distributed products 
over which they have no productive control; from the interest in 
supporting the macroeconomic benefits of the industrial revolution to 
the desire to prevent the entire cost of defective products from being 
borne by the victims of misfortune; and from the ancient concern 
with protecting only a party’s ability to earn sustenance to the 
modern-day recognition that the law ought to safeguard more than 
physical injuries and economic losses. To accommodate those goals, 
the courts have recognized that tort law must be adaptable to be able 
to protect new interests from harm.127 
The problem here is one that deserves tort law protection. Like 
any new invention, the World Wide Web offers unforeseen 
opportunities, but also creates unanticipated problems. The birth of 
the Kodak portable camera gave everyone the opportunity to record 
on celluloid whatever the lens could capture.128 The ability of today’s 
ubiquitous cell phones to take still photographs or moving pictures 
gives everyone the opportunity to play Matthew Brady or Steven 
Spielberg. The ease by which photographs and films can be uploaded 
 
 126. See, e.g., Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 234–35 (1995) (“[I]n our system 
of adjudication, principles seldom can be settled ‘on the basis of one or two cases, but require a 
closer working out.’” (quoting Roscoe Pound, Survey of the Conference Problems, 14 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 324, 339 (1940))); Paul Oskar Kristeller, “Creativity” and “Tradition”, 44 J. HIST. IDEAS 
105, 112 (1983) (“We should realize from the beginning that a completely stable or rigid tradition 
that never admits change is humanly impossible and has never existed.”). 
 127. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (recognizing legitimacy 
of defamation claims); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900–02 (Cal. 1962) 
(endorsing strict liability for defective products); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 
440–44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (concluding that manufacturers should be held 
strictly liable in tort for defective products); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 
(N.Y. 1916) (Cardozo, J.) (eliminating requirement of proof of privity of contract in order to 
recover for injuries caused by a defective product); see also FLEMING, supra note 94, at 3–6; 
G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 3 (1980). 
 128. Some have said that it was a photographer’s use of a camera to take photographs at his 
daughter’s wedding that so troubled Samuel Warren that he contacted his friend and classmate 
Louis Brandeis, and together they wrote the seminal article on privacy, Warren & Brandeis, supra 
note 71. See ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 49–51. The story, however, likely is apocryphal. See 
SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 109.  
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to YouTube, Facebook, or other Internet sites allows millions of 
people to view those images on numerous occasions and for an 
indefinite time. The boorish practice of revenge porn inflicts harm on 
its victims without any corresponding social benefit. Providing 
redress in damages for such conduct is entirely reasonable and 
directly furthers the mission of tort law. 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.129 
favorably viewed promissory estoppel principles, rather than tort 
law, as the basis for relief, but its rationale fits the latter theory too. 
Barnes would allow a plaintiff to perfect the claim, already 
recognized by tort law, for an invasion of privacy by proving a 
breach of that implied agreement of confidentiality or, in a word, 
betrayal. As explained above, a plaintiff would need to show that 
there was an express or implied agreement between the parties that a 
photograph be only for the recipient’s possession and use or, at least, 
certainly would not be broadcast to the world via the Internet. Barnes 
clearly was aware of the harms that revenge porn can inflict on a 
victim—in the court’s words, the case involved “a dangerous, cruel, 
and highly indecent use of the internet for the apparent purpose of 
revenge”130—and believed that common law promissory estoppel 
principles could fill the gap left by federal law by enabling a victim 
to sue whoever posted the photographs. The name given to the 
critical link in a plaintiff’s proof, however, is immaterial; what 
counts is the rationale. The rationale of Barnes fits whatever label is 
applied to a revenge porn claim.131 
4.  The Potential Influence of Fourth  
Amendment Theory 
There is one more defense to consider. An opponent of a remedy 
for revenge porn would argue that whatever we tell someone else is 
presumptively his to do with as he pleases. Indeed, insofar as we 
 
 129. 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 130. Id. at 1098. 
 131. It is a separate question whether bringing a damages action is a wise decision. Some 
victims of defamation or the invasion of privacy may prefer not to seek relief in court in order to 
avoid the increased publication of the comments or photographs that would follow from the 
public acts of filing and litigating a lawsuit. Oftentimes, the defendants cannot pay a large 
judgment. See Laird, supra note 25 (“‘The general rule is that these people are not wealthy,’ 
[attorney John] Morgan says. ‘They’re young men and they think it’s funny.’”). Yet, plaintiffs 
will bring such lawsuits to seek vindication, to inflict the cost of litigation on an offender, or in 
the hope of obtaining an apology. See SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 119–22. 
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define our reasonable expectations of privacy by current legal 
doctrine, especially by what the Supreme Court has defined as the 
law, we have little to complain about if someone betrays our trust. 
The Court has made it clear that “‘[t]he risk of being overheard by an 
eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer or deceived as to the 
identity of one with whom one deals is probably inherent in the 
conditions of human society. It is the kind of risk we necessarily 
assume whenever we speak.’”132 If so, it follows that we have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in anything that we give to a third 
party, whether it is a briefcase or an intimate photograph, because we 
always assume the risk of betrayal.133 For example, the Fourth 
Amendment134 may protect our “reasonable expectation of 
privacy,”135 but only for as long as information in fact remains 
 
 132. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966) (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 
U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
 133. See, e.g., id. at 301–02 (the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the government’s use 
of unidentified informants). 
 134. The Fourth Amendment provides as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 135. Justice Harlan coined the phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy” in his concurring 
opinion in Katz v. United States. See 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Katz is 
the leading case for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment protects people and their privacy, 
not places. Charles Katz used a public outdoor telephone booth to engage in an activity familiar to 
all March Madness fans: gambling on sporting events. Unbeknownst to Katz, the FBI had 
attached an electronic listening and recording device to the exterior of the phone booth, taped his 
conversations, and used them against him at a trial for violating the federal gambling laws. 
Walking back from prior law that had limited a Fourth Amendment “search” to a government 
trespass, the Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the government had unlawfully violated Katz’s 
privacy interest in the content of his conversations. The Court wrote that “the correct solution of 
Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase 
‘constitutionally protected area’” and that “the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a 
general constitutional ‘right to privacy.’” Id. at 350. As the Court reasoned, the Fourth 
Amendment “protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its 
protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all.” Id. Eschewing its prior 
use of the term “constitutionally protected area” to define the scope of the Fourth Amendment, 
see, e.g., Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 301–02; Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510 (1961), the 
Court wrote that asking whether an outdoor public phone booth was “a ‘constitutionally protected 
area’” was a mistake, because “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” Katz, 389 
U.S. at 351. On the one hand, the Court reasoned, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection,” while, 
on the other hand, “what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, 
may be constitutionally protected.” Id. at 351–52. Katz was visible when he used the telephone, 
the Court noted, but that fact was irrelevant because what he could reasonably have thought was 
that he was secure against not “the intruding eye,” but “the uninvited ear.” Id. at 352. 
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private. We lose whatever expectation we may have had in whatever 
we voluntarily reveal to a third party.136 Why should tort law give 
someone a remedy for betrayal by a private party when there is no 
remedy for betrayal by the government, the setting where it matters 
the most? 
That is a fair argument. Communal expectations influence the 
legal protection that society is willing to recognize as reasonable. 
That is precisely why some observers, such as U.S. Ninth Circuit 
Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, have argued that we need to do a better 
job of protecting our privacy if we expect the law to do the same.137 
By publicly using cell phones to broadcast our discussions to 
whoever can hear what we say, and by exposing our private thoughts 
to the world at large by posting them on Facebook or blasting them 
via Twitter, we are slowly forfeiting our ability to argue persuasively 
that we are entitled to protect as private certain aspects of our lives. 
That modern-day version of the injunction “Physician, heal thyself!” 
is salutary. Judge Kozinski is right to warn us to avoid becoming 
accomplices to our own versions of EDtv if we want to lay claim to 
legal protection for unflattering aspects of whatever we do or say.138  
 
Katz held the promise of being a watershed decision in Fourth Amendment law. As it 
turned out, however, the Court did not go very far down that road. Four years later in United 
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), the Court held that a person who invites someone into his or 
her home assumes the risk of being betrayed and being electronically recorded. White effectively 
limited Katz to the use of telephones. As Professor Anthony Amsterdam once wrote: “I can 
conceive of no rational system of concerns and values that restricts the government’s power to 
rifle my drawers or tap my telephone but not its power to infiltrate my home or my life with a 
legion of spies.” Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. 
REV. 349, 365 (1974). Yet, that is precisely where White left Fourth Amendment law. 
 136. See Goodman, supra note 25 (“Once you hit the send button, you’ve lost control.”); cf. 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). Miller 
involved a party’s bank records, and Smith involved the telephone numbers that someone dials. In 
each case, the Court concluded that once someone allows a third party to have access to personal 
information—such as a bank, as in Miller, or the telephone company, as in Smith—that person 
forfeits any privacy interest that he may have had in that information. Cf. SEC v. Jerry T. 
O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 743 (1984) (“It is established that, when a person communicates 
information to a third party even on the understanding that the communication is confidential, he 
cannot object if the third party conveys that information or records thereof to law enforcement 
authorities.”). 
 137. See Kozinski, supra note 1, at 123–24. Professor Geoffrey Stone has also noted that 
members of the Facebook generation may be slowly losing the ability to claim that someone else 
has invaded their privacy. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Privacy, the First Amendment, and the Internet, 
in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND REPUTATION, supra note 8, at 193–94. 
 138. The film EDTV (Universal Pictures 1999) depicted what life would be like for someone 
who agreed to have his life broadcast 24/7/365. 
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But it does not follow that tort law cannot offer a remedy to a 
victim of betrayal. To start with, the Fourth Amendment only 
establishes a minimum limitation on what a government agent may 
do to a private party—forbidding “unreasonable searches and 
seizures”—absent some other positive law. It does not exhaust the 
available restrictions that the law can and should impose on how 
members of the public should treat each other.139 Indeed, the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply to private actions at all,140 so there is no 
reason to use it as the exclusive set of rules governing interpersonal 
conduct. Moreover, tort law can reject the binary choice that the 
Fourth Amendment presents by recognizing a privacy interest in 
information that is shared among a small number of people, but is 
not in the public domain.141 Finally, the Fourth Amendment is 
ultimately beside the point because it does not prevent parties from 
contracting to keep certain aspects of their lives confidential. 
Someone who is the victim of a breach of that contract should be 
able to obtain legal redress. Here, the remedy is for the harm caused 
by the invasion of privacy accomplished by virtue of betrayal. Tort 
law awards damages for an invasion of privacy, and contract law 
allows a party to recover for the breach of an implied-in-law 
contract. Here, tort law just combines the two theories into one. The 
Fourth Amendment may not prohibit the government from taking 
advantage of our weaknesses, but that hardly means that society, via 
the courts, cannot use tort law as a means of deterring us from 
injuring others through a broken promise. Accordingly, the rationale 
underlying the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions does 
not militate against recognizing liability for revenge porn. 
C.  State Criminal Law:  
Revenge Porn Statutes 
Several states have decided to address this problem by making 
revenge porn a crime.142 New Jersey went first. Early in 2004, New 
 
 139. See, e.g., Lewis v. LeGrow, 670 N.W.2d 675, 684–85 (Mich. App. 2003) (rejecting 
argument that state privacy statute should be limited to interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 140. See, e.g., Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 
U.S. 465, 475 (1921). 
 141. See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 162–63; Strahilevitz, supra note 109. 
 142. See, e.g., Stacy Teicher Khadaroo, Revenge Porn: With Arizona, 10 States Now Outlaw 
Such Postings, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 1, 2014, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA 
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Jersey enacted a statute making it a crime to take or distribute 
photographs of someone else without her consent if the photographs 
expose her “intimate parts” or depict her being involved in sexual 
activity.143 New Jersey prosecutors have used that law 
infrequently,144 but did bring a charge under it in State v. Parsons.145 
Parsons was briefly involved with a woman, J.B., whom he had met 
through an online dating service. Although their relationship was not 
intimate, they exchanged “clothed” and “unclothed” photographs of 
each other with the understanding that neither one would share them 
with anyone else. The relationship ended after two months, and J.B. 
and Parsons each reacted angrily. Parsons ultimately sent the nude 
photos of J.B. to her employer, a public school, saying that she was 
unfit to be a teacher.146 The New Jersey trial and appellate divisions 
rejected Parsons’ argument that his conduct was not a crime, ruling 
that the unpermitted disclosure of nude photos of J.B. violated the 
statute.147 Under the New Jersey courts’ ruling in Parsons, posting 
revenge porn on the Internet would be a crime under New Jersey 
law. 
 
/Politics/2014/0501/Revenge-porn-With-Arizona-10-states-now-outlaw-such-postings; State 
‘Revenge Porn’ Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncsl.org/research 
/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-revenge-porn-legislation.aspx 
(last updated Sept. 2, 2014). Other states also are considering remedial legislation. See NAT’L 
CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATORS, supra. 
Some foreign nations have criminalized the distribution of revenge porn. See, e.g., An Act 
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Photo and Video Voyeurism, Prescribing Penalties 
Therefor, and for Other Purposes, Rep. Act No. 9995, 14th Cong. 3d Regular Sess. (July 27, 
2009) (Phil.), available at http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2010/ra_9995_2010.html; 
Oliver Milman, Sexting: Victoria Makes It An Offence to Send Explicit Images Without Consent, 
GUARDIAN, Dec. 11, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/12/sexting-victoria 
-makes-it-an-offence; Yifa Yaakov, Israeli Law Makes Revenge Porn a Sex Crime, TIMES OF 
ISRAEL, Jan. 6, 2014, http://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-law-labels-revenge-porn-a-sex-crime/. 
In 2010, a man was convicted in New Zealand for posting revenge porn on Facebook. See 
Tsoulis-Reay, supra note 21. 
 143. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9 (West 2013). 
 144. The best known prosecution was the conviction of Dharun Ravi for using a webcam to 
secretly videotape intimate pictures of his college roommate Tyler Clementi having sex with 
another man. Clementi committed suicide after the images were circulated. See, e.g., Ian Parker, 
The Story of a Suicide: Two College Roommates, a Webcam, and a Tragedy, NEW YORKER 
(Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/02/06/120206fa_fact_parker?current 
Page=all; Kate Zernike, Jail Term Ends After 20 Days for Ex-Rutgers Student, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/20/nyregion/dharun-ravi-ex-rutgers-student 
-who-spied-leaves-jail.html?_r=0. That case involved surreptitious videotaping, so it does not 
directly bear on revenge porn. 
 145. 2011 WL 6089210 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2011). 
 146. Id. at *1. 
 147. Id. at *2. 
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California followed almost a decade later. In the autumn of 
2013, California adopted a more narrowly defined statute, one that 
prohibits the posting of revenge porn under certain circumstances. 
The new statute makes it a crime to record and distribute “the 
intimate body part or parts” of someone else “under circumstances 
where the parties agree or understand that the image shall remain 
private” and the subject of the images suffers “serious emotional 
distress” as a result.148 In 2014, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Maryland, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin enacted their own 
revenge porn legislation.149 The bills differ in several respects, but 
each one makes it a crime to publish nude images, or images 
depicting someone in sexual activity, if the person making the 
disclosure knows or should have known that the subject of the image 
did not consent to the disclosure.150 Because the focus on those laws 
 
 148. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(a), (j) (West 2012). Some commentators argued that loopholes 
in the original version of that California law weakened its deterrent effect because, for example, 
the statute did not apply to individuals who took “selfies.” See, e.g., Julia Dahl, “Revenge Porn” 
Law in California a Good First Step, But Flawed, Experts Say, CBS NEWS (Oct. 3, 2013, 11:54 
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57605761-504083/revenge-porn-law-in 
-california-a-good-first-step-but-flawed-experts-say/; Eric Goldman, California’s New Law 
Shows It’s Not Easy To Regulate Revenge Porn, FORBES (Oct. 8, 2013, 12:03 PM), http:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/10/08/californias-new-law-shows-its-not-easy-to 
-regulate-revenge-porn/; Kelly, supra note 23; Jessica Roy, California’s New Anti-Revenge Porn 
Bill Won’t Protect Most Victims, TIME (Oct. 3, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/10/03 
/californias-new-anti-revenge-porn-bill-wont-protect-most-victims/. California recently addressed 
that issue. On September 30, 2014, Governor Jerry Brown signed an amendment to the Revenge 
Porn statute that expanded it to penalize the distribution of an image, rather than the taking and 
subsequent distribution of the image. S.B. 1255, 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2014), available at 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140SB1255. The result 
is that “selfies” would now be included within the scope of the law. 
 149. See H.B. 2515, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2014), available at 
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/51leg/2r/laws/0268.pdf; H.B. 14-1378, 2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Colo. 2014), available at http://www.leg.state.co.us/clics/clics2014a/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3 
/B8622059E18D26C687257C9A005794F0?Open&file=1378_enr.pdf; H.B. 838 2013–2014 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2014), available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/20132014 
/143392.pdf; H.B. 1750, 27th Leg. (Haw. 2014), available at http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov 
/session2014/bills/HB1750.htm; H.B. 563, 62d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2014), available at 
http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/legislation/2014/H0563.pdf; H.B. 43, 2014 Gen. Assemb. (Md. 
2014), available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014RS/bills/hb/hb0043E.pdf; H.B. 71, 2014 
Gen. Sess. (Utah 2014), available at http://le.utah.gov/~2014/bills/hbillenr/HB0071.pdf; H.B. 
326, 2014 Sess. § 1 (Va. 2014) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2–386.2 (2014)); S.B. 367, 
2013 Leg., 101st Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2014), available at https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2013 
/related/acts/243.pdf. 
 150. The Colorado, Maryland, Utah, and Virginia statutes require the state to prove that the 
responsible party acted with the intent to harass the subject of the photograph and to inflict 
serious emotional distress on that person. See Colo. H.B. 14-1378 § 1; Utah H.B. 71; Va. H.B. 
326 § 1. The other laws do not have that requirement. The Georgia statute requires the 
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is on the unpermitted disclosure of an image, not on the original act 
of taking it, the statutes should reach “selfies” sent from one partner 
to another.  
In sum, a fair number of states have made revenge porn a crime 
whenever the subject has not consented to publication. Those statutes 
therefore parallel the tort remedy described above. The new criminal 
laws speak in terms of consent, rather than betrayal, but the proof 
required is the same. 
It may not be long before someone is prosecuted under one of 
the new criminal laws. The principal constitutional challenge to those 
statutes will be whether they violate the First Amendment Free 
Speech Clause.151 The next section discusses that issue. 
III.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT  
FREE SPEECH CLAUSE 
The Internet serves as a forum for publication or exchange of 
ideas, expression, or images. Parties who post images on the Internet 
will claim an entitlement to the same First Amendment protection 
 
prosecution to prove that the posting “serves no legitimate purpose to the depicted person.” Ga. 
H.B. 838 § 1. The other statutes do not require such proof. The Hawaii statute requires the actual 
consent of the subject of the image. See Haw. H.B. 1750 § 1. The other laws appear to allow a 
person to publish an image if he or she reasonably believes that the subject has consented. The 
Colorado law creates a damages cause of action for the subject. See Colo. H.B. 14-1378 § 1(4). 
The other statutes do not. The Idaho statute allows the prosecution to prove that the photographer 
intentionally published an image with knowledge that the image was intended to remain private, 
or did that act with reckless disregard for knowledge that the image was intended to remain 
private. See Idaho H.B. 563. The Utah statute requires proof of actual emotional distress or harm. 
See Utah H.B. 71. The Wisconsin statute requires proof that the person making the disclosure 
knows that the subject does not consent. See Wis. S.B. 367 §§ 1–4 (2014). 
 151. There are additional issues that will arise in connection with criminal prosecutions for 
revenge porn. One is whether the relevant state law is sufficiently clear that it can withstand 
challenge on the ground that it is void for vagueness. For a discussion of the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine and its application to the criminal law, see, for example, Edwin Meese III & Paul J. 
Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 
760–61 (2012); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme 
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960) (discussing the historical development of the void-for-
vagueness doctrine). Insofar as a criminal statute requires the government to prove that a person 
posted images with the intent to harass, injure, or extort the subject, the statute should be able to 
withstand challenge. The Supreme Court has often written that the inclusion of a mens rea 
element in a criminal law helps to avoid unconstitutional vagueness. See, e.g., Posters ‘N’ Things, 
Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 526 (1994); Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman 
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 & n.14 (1982) (collecting cases). Tort actions receive less 
rigorous scrutiny than penal sanctions. See Flipside, 455 U.S. at 498–99 & n.13 (collecting 
cases). Accordingly, any criminal statute that survives a vagueness challenge can serve as a 
model for a tort action. 
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that the owner of a bookstore or a movie theater receives.152 They 
will argue that the government cannot criminalize as legally 
“obscene” simple depictions of nudity,153 nor can the government 
prohibit the publication of “indecent” photographs on the Internet.154 
State tort law permitting recovery for the online posting of nude 
photographs raises the same First Amendment issues because an 
award of damages also can have the same censorious or deterrent 
effect.155 The result, a defendant will argue, is that revenge porn is 
constitutionally protected speech despite its offensive character.156 
The Free Speech Clause has proved to be a formidable barrier to 
attempts to use the tort or criminal laws to prevent disclosure of 
offensive communications, on the Internet or elsewhere.157 A victim 
or a prosecutor would face a well-fortified barricade. As explained 
 
 152. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (holding 
unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause provisions of the Child Online Protection Act 
(COPA), Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1994 ed. 
Supp. II)), that required online service providers to prevent minors from accessing “material that 
is harmful to minors”); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding 
unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause provisions of the Communications Decency Act, 
Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as 
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a) & 223(d) (2006)), that prohibited use of the Internet to transmit 
“indecent images” or to send “patently offensive messages” minors); cf. Sable Commc’ns of Cal. 
v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126–31 (1989) (holding unconstitutional a congressional ban on so-called 
“dial-a-porn” “indecent” telecommunications). But see, e.g., Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties 
Union, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (rejecting argument that COPA’s use of “community standards” to 
determine what is “harmful to minors” violates the First Amendment). 
 153. See supra note 48. 
 154. See infra note 157. 
 155. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991) (“[T]he application of state 
rules of law in state courts in a manner alleged to restrict First Amendment freedoms constitutes 
‘state action’ under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 265 (1964). 
 156. See, e.g., Gloria Goodale, California Outlaws ‘Revenge Porn.’ Not Everyone Thinks 
That’s a Good Idea, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 2, 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA 
/Justice/2013/1002/California-outlaws-revenge-porn.-Not-everyone-thinks-that-s-a-good-idea. 
-video; Fuchs, supra note 26 (quoting former state court judge Andrew Napolitano, stating that 
the First Amendment protects a person from liability for publishing freely given intimate photos); 
Sarah Jeong, Revenge Porn Is Bad. Criminalizing It Is Worse, WIRED (Oct. 28, 2013, 9:30 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/2013/10/why-criminalizing-revenge-porn-is-a-bad-idea/; cf. Jerry Brito, 
Are Laws Against “Revenge Porn” a Good Idea?, REASON.COM (Oct. 21, 2013), 
http://reason.com/archives/2013/10/21/are-laws-against-revenge-porn-a-good-ide (questioning the 
wisdom of anti-revenge porn laws). 
 157. See Tex. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an 
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”); id. (collecting 
cases); supra note 153. 
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below, however, they can break through that barricade in some 
instances.158 
A.  First Amendment Precedent 
Defendants likely would rely heavily on several Supreme Court 
rulings that the government cannot hold someone liable for the 
publication of true information. For example, in Florida Star v. 
B.J.F., the Court held that the First Amendment protects a newspaper 
for publishing the name of a rape victim that the paper lawfully 
acquired from a police report placed in the department’s 
pressroom.159 In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court held that the First 
Amendment protects the right of a newspaper to publish the 
transcript of a wiretap in which the newspaper had played no role 
even though the wiretap itself was illegal.160 Defendants in revenge 
porn cases would maintain that cases such as Florida Star and 
Bartnicki disallow a state from imposing civil or criminal liability on 
the publication of truthful information regardless of the nature or 
strength of the privacy interest that the state seeks to protect. 
Defendants also would rely on Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell,161 which involved the publication of offensive material 
depicting the plaintiff as part of a parody. Falwell, a well-known 
minister and public figure, sued Hustler magazine over a liquor 
advertisement that parodied him. The ad, which “clearly played on 
the sexual double entendre of the general subject of ‘first times,’” 
referred to the first time that Falwell allegedly sampled a particular 
liquor, but also implied that Falwell had engaged in a drunken 
 
 158. Others agree. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Florida “Revenge Porn” Bill, THE VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Apr. 10, 2013, 7:51 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/04/10/florida-revenge 
-porn-bill/ (“I do think that a suitably clear and narrow statute banning nonconsensual posting of 
nude pictures of another, in a context where there’s good reason to think that the subject did not 
consent to publication of such pictures, would likely be upheld by the courts. . . . 
[N]onconsensual depictions of nudity could be prohibited.”). 
 159. 491 U.S. 524 (1989). Florida Star was the most recent in a series of cases dealing with 
the media’s disclosure of such information. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97 
(1979) (ruling that newspapers cannot be prosecuted for disclosing the name of a juvenile 
offender that the papers lawfully obtained by listening to the police band and interviewing 
witnesses); Okla. Publ’g Co. v. Dist. Ct. of Okla., 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (ruling that a newspaper 
cannot be held liable for publishing the events that transpired during a closed-door juvenile 
proceeding when the judge allowed media to sit in the courtroom); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 
420 U.S. 469 (1975) (ruling that a television station cannot be held liable in tort for reporting the 
name of a rape victim that had been disclosed in court at trial). 
 160. 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
 161. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
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incestuous relationship with his mother in an outhouse.162 Falwell 
sued, claiming that he was the victim of defamation, an invasion of 
his privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress due to the 
way in which he was portrayed in the ad. At the end of trial, the 
district court granted Hustler a directed verdict on Falwell’s privacy 
claim, and the jury rejected his claim of defamation but returned a 
verdict in his favor on his emotional distress claim.163 After the 
district court and court of appeals upheld the verdict on that ground, 
Hustler sought review in the Supreme Court. As the Court saw it, the 
case presented “a novel question involving First Amendment 
limitations upon a State’s authority to protect its citizens from the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.”164 The question was 
“whether a public figure may recover damages for emotional harm 
caused by the publication of an ad parody offensive to him, and 
doubtless gross and repugnant in the eyes of most.”165 The Court 
answered, “No.” 
The Court saw the Falwell case as another example of 
potentially offensive public speech uttered about a public figure.166 
The Court found no reason not to apply the New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan167 constitutional standard for libel to Falwell’s claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.168 The Court refused to 
exempt Falwell’s emotional distress claim from the defamation 
standard adopted in Sullivan because each case involved the same 
basic pattern: allegedly offensive statements about a person involved 
in public affairs.169 The two scenarios were the same, the Court 
concluded, so there was no reason for different legal rules to apply to 
each one. The Court also was troubled by the consequence of 
refusing to apply the Sullivan standard to political satire: “Were we 
to hold otherwise, there can be little doubt that political cartoonists 
and satirists would be subjected to damages awards without any 
showing that their work falsely defamed its subject.”170 Unwilling to 
 
 162. Id. at 48. 
 163. Id. at 48–49. 
 164. Id. at 50. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id. at 50–52. 
 167. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 168. See Falwell, 485 U.S. at 50–52. 
 169. See id. at 52–53. 
 170. Id. at 53; see id. at 53–56. 
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take the risk of cheapening the debate over public figures or issues, 
the Court held that Falwell could not recover for the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress unless he could satisfy the Sullivan 
test, used when a public figure brings an action for defamation.171 
Given the jury’s rejection of his claim for defamation, the Court 
reasoned, Falwell could not prevail on his emotional distress 
claim.172 
The argument from Falwell would go as follows: The gravamen 
of a plaintiff’s revenge-porn claim is that someone published images 
of her naked or that revealed intimate details of her life, an action 
that constituted outrageous conduct or that placed her in a false light 
by mischaracterizing her as promiscuous. Regardless of what the 
claim may be, the defendant’s argument would go, First Amendment 
law denies a plaintiff the right to recover. A plaintiff should not be 
able to recharacterize an invasion of privacy or “false light” 
defamation claim as an entirely different tort, subject to different 
rules, simply because of her mistaken judgment about the possibility 
that a former partner would publish photographs that she freely and 
knowingly allowed him to possess. The term “revenge porn” may 
sound nefarious, and the conduct involved may be offensive, but the 
law should not compensate someone for the consequences of a 
voluntary decision that, viewed in hindsight, was ill-considered. 
Since the plaintiff was not coerced into posing for a photographer or 
taking a photograph of herself, the law should not interfere in her 
decision, however much she may now regret it. 
The Supreme Court’s precedents, however, do not reach that far. 
In Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co.,173 the Court upheld a 
judgment in a plaintiff’s favor on a “false light” privacy claim. The 
claim was based on a magazine story that, given the jury’s verdict, 
mistakenly depicted the plaintiff and her family in the period after 
the plaintiff’s husband’s death. The Court sustained the judgment in 
her favor. What is important about Cantrell is the nature of the 
inaccuracies in the story.174 The plaintiff’s theory was that those 
 
 171. See id. at 56. 
 172. See id. at 57. 
 173. Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974). In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 
374, 390–91 (1967), the Court had reserved the question whether the government can penalize the 
publication of truthful but private information unrelated to public affairs. The Cantrell decision 
answered that question in the affirmative. 
 174. The Supreme Court described the story as follows:  
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errors made her the object of “pity and ridicule” in her community. 
By contrast, a revenge porn photograph is likely to leave a viewer 
with a far more damaging impression—namely, that the victim is a 
trollop. Neither B.J.F. nor Bartnicki cited Cantrell, much less 
overruled it. Moreover, B.J.F. and Bartnicki cannot be read as 
protecting the disclosure of any and all true information. That 
interpretation would permit the disclosure of material protected by 
the copyright laws, even though the First Amendment does not 
nullify the Copyright Clause.175 It even would permit a media outlet 
to steal information and publish material with impunity. The First 
Amendment, however, does not reach that far.176 In fact, in B.J.F. 
and Bartnicki the Court went out of its way to make clear that the 
holding in each case did not protect such conduct,177 and Bartnicki 
 
  Eszterhas’ story appeared as the lead feature in the August 4, 1968, edition of the 
Plain Dealer Sunday Magazine. The article stressed the family’s abject poverty; the 
children’s old, ill-fitting clothes and the deteriorating condition of their home were 
detailed in both the text and accompanying photographs. As he had done in his 
original, prize-winning article on the Silver Bridge disaster, Eszterhas used the Cantrell 
family to illustrate the impact of the bridge collapse on the lives of the people in the 
Point Pleasant area. 
  It is conceded that the story contained a number of inaccuracies and false 
statements. Most conspicuously, although Mrs. Cantrell was not present at any time 
during the reporter’s visit to her home, Eszterhas wrote, “Margaret Cantrell will talk 
neither about what happened nor about how they are doing. She wears the same mask 
of non-expression she wore at the funeral. She is a proud woman. Her world has 
changed. She says that after it happened, the people in town offered to help them out 
with money and they refused to take it.” Other significant misrepresentations were 
contained in details of Eszterhas’ descriptions of the poverty in which the Cantrells 
were living and the dirty and dilapidated conditions of the Cantrell home. 
  The case went to the jury on a so-called “false light” theory of invasion of privacy. 
In essence, the theory of the case was that by publishing the false feature story about 
the Cantrells and thereby making them the objects of pity and ridicule, the respondents 
damaged Mrs. Cantrell and her son William by causing them to suffer outrage, mental 
distress, shame, and humiliation. 
Cantrell, 419 U.S. at 247–48 (footnotes omitted). 
 175. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555–60 
(1985); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY 16 (2003). 
 176. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (ruling that the 
First Amendment does not prohibit a state damages award for the unconsented-to broadcast of an 
entertainer’s entire performance). 
 177. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001) (“[T]hree factual matters . . . 
distinguish most of the cases that have arisen under [the federal wiretap laws]. First, respondents 
played no part in the illegal interception. Rather, they found out about the interception only after 
it occurred, and in fact never learned the identity of the person or persons who made the 
interception. Second, their access to the information on the tapes was obtained lawfully, even 
though the information itself was intercepted unlawfully by someone else. Third, the subject 
matter of the conversation was a matter of public concern.” (citations omitted)); Florida Star v. 
B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532–33 (1989) (“Our cases have carefully eschewed reaching this ultimate 
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also reaffirmed the Court’s earlier decision in Branzburg v. Hayes,178 
which rejected that proposition.179 The Free Speech Clause, as 
construed by the Supreme Court, does not foreclose any and all 
remedies for an invasion of privacy.180 
The Falwell case protects a speaker’s right to make scandalous 
or even “outrageous” statements about a public figure or matter of 
public importance,181 and that principle applies to speech in the form 
of spoken words or images, as it did in Falwell itself.182 The Court’s 
holding, however, does not foreclose a plaintiff from initiating the 
tort action described above, seeking damages from revenge porn. 
The Court carefully limited its holding in Falwell to cases involving 
a public figure.183 The typical victim of revenge porn would be a 
private individual, not a public official or a public figure. That 
difference is important. As the Supreme Court explained in Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc.184 and reiterated in Falwell, the public has a 
strong interest in a robust discussion of matters of public 
importance.185 Moreover, a public official or figure has a far stronger 
 
question, mindful that the future may bring scenarios which prudence counsels our not resolving 
anticipatorily. . . . We continue to believe that the sensitivity and significance of the interests 
presented in clashes between First Amendment and privacy rights counsel relying on limited 
principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case.”). 
 178. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 179. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 532 n.19 (“Our holding, of course, does not apply to punishing 
parties for obtaining the relevant information unlawfully. ‘It would be frivolous to assert—and no 
one does in these cases—that the First Amendment, in the interest of securing news or otherwise, 
confers a license on either the reporter or his news sources to violate valid criminal laws. 
Although stealing documents or private wiretapping could provide newsworthy information, 
neither reporter nor source is immune from conviction for such conduct, whatever the impact on 
the flow of news.’” (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691)); see also, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 
444 U.S. 507 (1980) (upholding CIA prepublication agreements over First Amendment 
challenge). Snepp is discussed infra at notes 195–200 and accompanying text.  
 180. See, e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 1975) (“Does the spirit of 
the Bill of Rights require that individuals be free to pry into the unnewsworthy private affairs of 
their fellowmen? In our view it does not. In our view fairly defined areas of privacy must have the 
protection of law if the quality of life is to continue to be reasonably acceptable. The public’s 
right to know is, then, subject to reasonable limitations so far as concerns the private facts of its 
individual members.” (footnote omitted)). 
 181. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988). 
 182. See id. at 48–49. 
 183. See id. at 56 (“We conclude that public figures and public officials may not recover for 
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one 
here at issue without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact 
which was made with ‘actual malice,’ i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with 
reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.”). 
 184. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 185. See Falwell, 485 U.S. at 50–56. 
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opportunity to rebut a disparaging claim than a private party because 
the former enjoys far greater access to the broadcast and print media 
than the latter.186 Because private parties are more vulnerable to 
defamatory claims than are public officials or figures, the Court 
reasoned in Gertz, the state has a correspondingly stronger interest in 
protecting private parties through tort law.187 Finally, a person who 
enters public life or who participates in the public debate assumes a 
risk of increased public scrutiny and strenuous challenge to his or her 
opinions.188 The Court therefore has given the states greater leeway 
to define their tort law standards to protect private parties than public 
officials or figures.189 
Falwell did not change that rule. Falwell was a public figure, so 
the Court had no occasion to decide what rule would apply to an 
emotional distress claim brought by a private figure. Falwell stands 
for the proposition that a public official or public figure cannot use 
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress to escape First 
Amendment limitations on his or her ability to recover damages for 
defamation. That is, Falwell makes it clear that a party who, under 
Sullivan, must prove “malice” in order to recover for defamation 
cannot simply relabel that claim as one for the intentional infliction 
of emotional distress and thereby avoid the difficult burden of proof 
that would govern a claim for libel or slander. Otherwise, any public 
official or figure, or any state, could make an end run around 
Sullivan through a creative description of a tort and defeat the 
public’s interest in “[t]he sort of robust public debate encouraged by 
the First Amendment.”190 
That concern is not present, however, if a state provides a 
private party with a properly limited tort remedy for revenge porn. 
The state has a legitimate interest in affording an individual 
protection against the destruction of her reputation due to a 
reasonable, albeit mistaken, judgment about someone else’s 
 
 186. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344–45. 
 187. See id. at 344. 
 188. See id. at 344–45. 
 189. See id. at 346–47 (“We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, 
the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or 
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.” (footnote omitted)). 
 190. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 51. 
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reliability.191 The Supreme Court recognized in Gertz that “[t]he 
legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is the 
compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by 
defamatory falsehood.”192 Invasions of privacy may involve the 
disclosure of true facts, rather than falsehoods, but the state has an 
equally legitimate interest in affording individuals the opportunity to 
avoid being tarred for all time by a mistaken judgment. Each tort 
“‘reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and 
worth of every human being—a concept at the root of any decent 
system of ordered liberty.’”193 If state law requires a plaintiff to 
prove that she or he was betrayed by the person who published 
revenge porn, tort law would be able to remedy the harms that 
speech causes without punishing an innocent party or chilling 
constitutionally protected third-party speech. A properly defined 
tort—that is, one that places on the plaintiff the burden of proving 
the betrayal of an express or tacit agreement not to publish such 
photographs—would provide compensation to deserving victims 
without trespassing on anyone’s constitutionally protected conduct. 
The enforcement of generally applicable laws against an 
individual speaker or even the professional media does not infringe 
on the First Amendment even if those laws have an incidental effect 
on the individual or media organization’s ability to gather and report 
news or express constitutionally protected speech.194 Among those 
generally applicable laws is the law of contracts. Everyone enjoys 
the right to freedom of speech, but no one, not even those of us who 
publish books, articles, or Internet blogs, can refuse to perform our 
end of a contract by claiming that doing so would stifle our ability to 
engage in the free expression of ideas. If we freely enter into a 
contract to limit our freedom to publish, we can be held to what we 
have agreed, and the courts can provide the aggrieved party with an 
appropriate remedy even if that remedy infringes on the rights that 
 
 191. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966) (“Society has a pervasive and 
strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation.”); Stone, supra note 137, at 
174, 190 (“The ability of individuals to engage in private conduct without having it broadcast to 
the world, the capacity of individuals to make mistakes without being haunted by them forever, 
and the freedom to live one’s life without having to answer publicly for every choice, are 
unquestionably legitimate personal and societal interests.” (footnote omitted)). 
 192. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341. 
 193. Id. (quoting Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
 194. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991); Branzburg v. Hayes, 
408 U.S. 665, 682–84 (1972). 
REVENGE PORN 4/16/2015  5:35 PM 
106 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:57 
we otherwise would have under the First Amendment. That is the 
lesson of Snepp v. United States.195 
Frank Snepp was an agent for the Central Intelligence Agency. 
Like every other CIA employee, Snepp signed an agreement as a 
condition of his employment in which he promised to submit for  
pre-publication review any book that he wrote, during or after his 
tenure as a government employee, relating to his work for the 
government.196 Snepp was in Vietnam in the period before the 
United States withdrew its troops as part of the agreement to end the 
Vietnam War, and he wrote a book entitled Decent Interval that was 
critical of the government’s withdrawal. The government sued Snepp 
for breaching the terms of his pre-publication agreement, and he 
defended in part on the ground that the agreement violated the First 
Amendment.197 The Supreme Court squarely rejected Snepp’s claim 
for two separate reasons. First, the Court noted that Snepp had 
voluntarily entered into that agreement when he accepted a position 
with the CIA, and that the agreement was a reasonable exercise of 
the government’s authority to protect classified information.198 
Second, the Court reasoned that, even in the absence of any such 
agreement, the government would have had a compelling interest in 
protecting the secrecy of whatever information Snepp acquired by 
virtue of his government employment that was “important to” the 
national security.199 The Court in Snepp therefore held that the 
 
 195. 444 U.S. 507 (1980); see also, e.g., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th 
Cir. 1975); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972) (both upholding similar 
CIA pre-publication agreements over First Amendment challenges); Joshua B. Bolten, Comment, 
Enforcing the CIA’s Secrecy Agreement Through Postpublication Civil Action: United States v. 
Snepp, 32 STAN. L. REV. 409 (1980). 
 196. The relevant portions of the agreement can be found in the court of appeals’ opinion. 
United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 930 nn.1–2 (4th Cir. 1979), rev’d, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
 197. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507–10. 
 198. “When Snepp accepted employment with the CIA, he voluntarily signed the agreement 
that expressly obligated him to submit any proposed publication for prior review. He does not 
claim that he executed this agreement under duress. Indeed, he voluntarily reaffirmed his 
obligation when he left the Agency. We agree with the Court of Appeals that Snepp’s agreement 
is an entirely appropriate exercise of the CIA Director’s statutory mandate to ‘protec[t] 
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.’” Id. at 509 n.3 (citation 
omitted); cf. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 31–37 (1984) (ruling that the First 
Amendment does not grant a party to litigation the right to publish material obtained during 
pretrial discovery but placed under a protective order). 
 199. “Moreover, this Court’s cases make clear that—even in the absence of an express 
agreement—the CIA could have acted to protect substantial government interests by imposing 
reasonable restrictions on employee activities that in other contexts might be protected by the 
First Amendment. . . . The Government has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of 
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government could sue Snepp for breaching his pre-publication 
contract even though doing so would otherwise infringe on his First 
Amendment right to publish.200 
It could be argued that Snepp was an unusual, if not 
extraordinary, case that led to a very limited, if not unique, decision. 
The argument would have been that the government has a stronger 
interest in regulating the disclosure of information that a government 
employee learns due solely to his status as a government employee 
than it has in regulating the conduct of private parties. Atop that, the 
argument would go, the government has a compelling interest in 
protecting against the disclosure of highly classified information vital 
to the nation’s defense—information that only a minute number of 
officials have access to use—the disclosure of which could 
irreparably harm the nation in ways that only trained professionals 
can fully understand. Moreover, whatever the law might be with 
respect to disclosure by government officials or private parties, the 
argument would continue, the First Amendment affords professional 
media outlets greater protection than it gives to individuals, because 
the media plays a vital role in the dissemination of information about 
matters of public interest. Accordingly, the argument would 
conclude, Snepp should not be read to permit the government to 
obtain relief against a media organization for its disclosure of truthful 
information. 
That argument might seem facially reasonable, but the law has 
not developed along those lines. The Supreme Court has made it 
clear that the same general, neutral laws that apply to private parties 
and businesses—such as the labor, antitrust, or environmental laws—
also apply to media defendants.201 A newspaper cannot refuse to 
honor an agreement to purchase paper or ink on the ground that the 
First Amendment trumps contract law principles requiring each party 
to honor its contractual obligations. Similarly, a media defendant can 
be held liable when it publishes information in violation of a promise 
 
information important to our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to 
the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service. . . . The agreement that Snepp signed is 
a reasonable means for protecting this vital interest.” Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n.3 (citations and 
internal punctuation omitted). 
 200. The Court decided that the appropriate remedy was to impose a constructive trust 
awarding the government all proceeds from the sale of Snepp’s book. See id. at 510–16. 
 201. See infra notes 205–09 and accompanying text. 
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of confidentiality similar to the one that Frank Snepp signed. That is 
the lesson of Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.202 
As noted above, Dan Cohen gave a newspaper information 
about a particular candidate for state office in return for its assurance 
that its source would remain confidential. The newspaper later 
identified Cohen as the source, however, and he sued for a breach of 
promise, seeking damages for having lost his job due to the 
disclosure. The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that Cohen could 
state a claim under the common law of promissory estoppel,203 but 
nonetheless ruled against him on the ground that allowing him to 
recover damages would violate the First Amendment Free Speech 
Clause.204 The Supreme Court reversed. 
The Court held that the First Amendment does not bar a claim 
brought under common law principles of promissory estoppel 
seeking damages for a breach of a promise of confidentiality.205 The 
Court saw no reason to create a special First Amendment exemption 
for the media from that common law doctrine. In the past the Court 
had made it clear that media are subject to generally applicable, 
content-neutral statutes, such as the copyright laws,206 the labor 
laws,207 the antitrust laws,208 and the tax laws.209 Those statutes, the 
Court noted, can be applied to the media in the same manner that 
they govern everyone else.210 The same is true, the Court held, of 
state laws governing promissory estoppel. That body of law does not 
single out the media or any particular type of speech for special 
unfavorable treatment. The state law applies to everyone and “simply 
requires those making promises to keep them.”211 Holding someone 
 
 202. 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
 203. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 203–04 (Minn. 1990), rev’d on other 
grounds, 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
 204. Id. at 205. 
 205. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
 206. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576–79 (1977) 
(ruling that the First Amendment does not give the media a right to violate the copyright laws). 
 207. See, e.g., Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192–93 (1946); Associated 
Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (ruling that the First Amendment does not protect the media 
against application of the labor laws). 
 208. See, e.g., Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969); Associated 
Press, 301 U.S. 103 (same, the anti-trust laws). 
 209. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r, 460 U.S. 575, 581–83 
(1983); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943) (same, the tax laws). 
 210. See Cowles Media, 501 U.S. at 669–70. 
 211. Id. at 671. 
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to his assurances, the Court concluded, does not infringe on anyone’s 
freedom of expression. “The parties themselves, as in this case, 
determine the scope of their legal obligations, and any restrictions 
that may be placed on the publication of truthful information are self-
imposed.”212 In addition, application of state promissory estoppel law 
would not deter third parties from engaging in protected forms of 
expression. Any deterrent effect would be “no more than the 
incidental, and constitutionally insignificant, consequence of 
applying to the press a generally applicable law that requires those 
who make certain kinds of promises to keep them.”213 
Cowles Media shows that recognition of a tort claim or criminal 
charge requiring proof of betrayal would not infringe on legitimate 
First Amendment interests. Cowles Media allows parties to contract 
away their First Amendment rights, treating the First Amendment as 
a freedom rather than as a set of handcuffs.214 Cowles Media also 
reveals that the Free Speech Clause does not bar a court from treating 
as confidential discussions between parties that occur in a 
relationship that society recognizes as privileged—for instance, 
between a lawyer and her client or between a physician and her 
patient—even when neither party makes or receives an explicit 
assurance of confidentiality. Society presumes that the parties to 
 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 672. Members of the academy, while sometimes critical of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Cowles Media, have nonetheless recognized that it allows parties to contract away or 
waive their First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Jerome A. Barron, Cohen v. Cowles Media and Its 
Significance for First Amendment Law and Journalism, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 419 (1994); 
Alan E. Garfield, The Mischief of Cohen v. Cowles Media, 35 GA. L. REV. 1087 (2001); Gilles, 
supra note 52, at 71; McClurg, supra note 52, at 909; Richards & Solove, supra note 53, at 179–
80; Stone, supra note 137, at 179 (all explaining that Cowles Media allows parties to contract 
away their First Amendment rights); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information 
Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1057 (2000) (“The Supreme Court explicitly held in Cohen v. Cowles Media 
that contracts not to speak are enforceable with no First Amendment problems. Enforcing 
people’s own bargains, the Court concluded (I think correctly), doesn’t violate those people’s 
rights, even if they change their minds after the bargain is struck.” (footnote omitted)). 
 214. See Volokh, supra note 213, at 1057–58 (“And such protection ought not be limited to 
express contracts, but should also cover implied contracts (though, as will be discussed below, 
there are limits to this theory). In many contexts, people reasonably expect—because of custom, 
course of dealing with the other party, or all the other factors that are relevant to finding an 
implied contract—that part of what their contracting partner is promising is confidentiality. This 
explains much of why it’s proper for the government to impose confidentiality requirements on 
lawyers, doctors, psychotherapists, and others: When these professionals say ‘I’ll be your 
advisor,’ they are implicitly promising that they’ll be confidential advisors, at least so long as 
they do not explicitly disclaim any such implicit promise.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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those relationships intend to exchange information in confidence 
even when they do not have an express written or oral agreement to 
that effect. Not every exchange, of course, qualifies for such 
protection. We do not expect that what we tell a police officer or a 
journalist will remain secret any more than we expect that what we 
say in a letter to the editor of the New York Times will never be 
disclosed to the world. But, as noted above, it would be a mistake to 
treat every disclosure as public simply because we made it to a 
trusted party. If so, then it surely would be permissible for contract 
law to treat certain revelations as being made only to those certain 
other parties in a special relationship with the speaker.215 
It should be irrelevant that Cowles Media involved a state law 
claim resting on promissory estoppel principles whereas a revenge 
porn claim would sound in tort. In Cowles Media, the Supreme Court 
did not suggest that there was a unique feature of promissory 
estoppel law that allows a plaintiff to overcome a First Amendment 
defense, a factor that is not present elsewhere in contract or tort law. 
What was critical in Cowles Media was the neutral character of the 
state-law claim. Minnesota’s promissory estoppel law, like its 
workers’ compensation laws, applied to media and non-media 
defendants alike.216 Promissory estoppel law also did not seek to 
censor speech. It only gave a remedy to parties injured by a broken 
promise, a promise that a person was free not to make.217 As long as 
 
 215. Id. at 1059 (“[T]he implicit contract theory could uphold laws that by default prevent 
lawyers, doctors, psychiatrists, sellers of medical supplies, and possibly sellers of videos and 
books from communicating information about their customers; but it wouldn’t uphold laws that 
by default prevent reporters (who are notorious for communicating embarrassing things, not 
keeping them confidential) from revealing what was said to them, prevent consumers from 
reviewing products, or prevent sellers of groceries or shoes from communicating who bought 
what from them. I doubt that most of us expect that someone selling us our food is implicitly 
promising to keep quiet about what they sold us.” (footnote omitted)). 
 216. See Cowles Media, 501 U.S. at 669–70 (“This case . . . [is controlled] . . . by the equally 
well-established line of decisions holding that generally applicable laws do not offend the First 
Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its 
ability to gather and report the news. . . . It is, therefore, beyond dispute that the publisher of a 
newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special 
privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others. . . . Accordingly, enforcement of such general 
laws against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement 
against other persons or organizations.” (citations and internal punctuation omitted)). 
 217. See id. at 671–72 (“Respondents and amici argue that permitting Cohen to maintain a 
cause of action for promissory estoppel will inhibit truthful reporting because news organizations 
will have legal incentives not to disclose a confidential source’s identity even when that person’s 
identity is itself newsworthy. . . . But if this is the case, it is no more than the incidental, and 
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the application of state civil or criminal law does not have a 
censorious effect beyond what a party voluntarily accepted, the label 
used to describe the state cause of action for a breach of a promise of 
confidentiality is immaterial. Accordingly, a tort remedy or criminal 
charge for revenge porn requiring proof of betrayal is not materially 
different from the promissory estoppel claim upheld over a First 
Amendment challenge in Cowles Media. No one must accept an 
agreement not to publish intimate images, and, if someone does, a 
tort or criminal remedy for betrayal only seeks to enforce a promise 
willingly made. 
B.  First Amendment Theory 
The same conclusion follows from the application of general 
free speech principles. The fundamental mission of the First 
Amendment is to prevent the government from censoring the free 
communication and exchange of ideas because it finds their content 
objectionable.218 That interest is particularly important when speech 
is necessary to or concerns the democratic process, members of our 
government, candidates for public office, or matters of public 
interest.219 Yet, the Free Speech Clause also extends beyond political 
expression. It embraces speech done for the purpose of artistic 
expression, public or private entertainment, or personal self-
fulfillment220 however “trivial, despicable, crass, and repulsive” that 
 
constitutionally insignificant, consequence of applying to the press a generally applicable law that 
requires those who make certain kinds of promises to keep them.”). 
 218. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Whitney v. California, 274 
U.S. 357, 375–77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630–
31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 219. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (“Speech is an essential 
mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people. . . . The 
right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a 
precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it. The First 
Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for 
political office.” (citations and internal punctuation omitted)); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, 
POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 26, 154–55 (1965). 
 220. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (holding unconstitutional the 
Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006), which makes it a crime falsely to claim to 
have received a decoration or medal of the armed forces); Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 
S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (ruling that the First Amendment protects the sale of violent video games); 
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (ruling that the First Amendment protects the right to 
engage in hateful protests directed at the funeral of a servicemember); United States v. Stevens, 
559 U.S. 460 (2010) (ruling that the First Amendment protects at least some depictions of acts of 
animal cruelty); see generally Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733 (“The Free Speech Clause exists 
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speech may be.221 The theory is that we should not exclude 
viewpoints from attaining currency in the “marketplace of ideas”222 
and that we should not keep individuals, in the exercise of their own 
autonomy, from expressing divergent or minority beliefs, because 
“one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”223 
Revenge porn implicates two basic free speech questions, 
questions that the Supreme Court and scholars have grappled with 
for more than a century: Is revenge porn a type of “speech” that the 
First Amendment protects? If revenge porn is protected speech, what 
protection should it receive? Those questions may be difficult to 
answer as a matter of free speech theory.224 For example, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that certain forms of speech—child 
pornography, fraud, incitement to criminal activity, obscenity, 
defamation, threats, and speech integral to criminal conduct (such as 
an agreement to commit murder)—are not protected.225 The Court 
also has held that some types of speech, most prominently 
commercial speech—that is, the offers and inducements to engage in 
commerce—are entitled to First Amendment protection,226 but not to 
 
principally to protect discourse on public matters, but we have long recognized that it is difficult 
to distinguish politics from entertainment, and dangerous to try.”).  
 221. SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 125. 
 222. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.  
 223. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1971); see, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two 
Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875 (1994) (discussing autonomy justification for free 
speech); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982); Stone, 
supra note 137, at 174 (“[T]he First Amendment generally forbids restrictions of speech in public 
discourse on the ground that it is offensive, unsettling, insulting, demeaning, annoying, snarling, 
bilious, rude, abusive, or nasty.”). 
 224. The First Amendment protects political tracts, photographs, films, and a host of other 
media of expression. See, e.g., Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (video games); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. 
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (advertising); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp. Inc., 529 U.S. 
803 (2000) (cable programming); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (information 
on beer labels); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 789 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (credit reports); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (films). The 
difficult issue is whether the content of revenge porn is protected, not the medium used. 
 225. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography); Pittsburgh 
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Com. on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (speech encouraging 
unlawful discrimination); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (knowingly and willfully 
threatening the life of the President); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); 
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (defamation); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 
336 U.S. 490 (1949) (speech integral to criminal conduct); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568 (1942) (taunts or “fighting words”); see also United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 
2544, 2546–47 (2012) (plurality opinion) (including perjury and impersonating a government 
official with the above list). 
 226. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 
(1980) (promotional advertising entitled to First Amendment protection); Va. State Bd. of 
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the same degree as other forms of speech.227 Does revenge porn fit 
into either category? 
Here the argument would be that revenge porn should receive at 
most de minimis First Amendment protection. Revenge porn exists 
merely to humiliate its victim; it does not inform public debate, nor 
is it a form of artistic self-expression. Professor Solove was right to 
note that “[d]isclosures made for spite, or to shame others, or simply 
to entertain, should not be treated the same as disclosures made to 
educate or inform.”228 Revenge porn also is not a legitimate form of 
self-expression because that rationale cannot be used to justify the 
intentional infliction of injury on someone else. Finally, it would be 
risible for anyone to claim that affording damages for this utterance 
would deter parties from engaging in political speech, or any other 
kind of legitimate expression. As such, it would belittle the First 
Amendment to afford revenge porn anything more than de minimis 
protection. 
Nonetheless, a plaintiff might have a difficult time persuading 
the Supreme Court to exclude revenge porn entirely from protected 
“speech.” In 2010 the Court refused to treat the visual depiction of 
horrific forms of animal cruelty as categorically unprotected speech. 
In United States v. Stevens,229 the Court was forced to decide 
 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (bans on advertising the 
price of prescription drugs is unconstitutional); see also, e.g., Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 
146–49 (1983) (employee speech that does not relate to “any matter of political, social, or other 
concern to the community” receives lesser First Amendment protection). 
 227. Commercial speech enjoys only a “subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment 
values.” Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). The reason is that the 
government has a considerable interest in regulating the terms of commercial transactions and the 
speech accompanying them. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 
(1983) (lotteries and related advertising); Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 
U.S. 328 (1986) (gambling and related advertising); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456 (identifying a 
securities prospectus, a corporate proxy statement, published price and shipping cost details 
among competitors, and employers’ threats of retaliation for conduct protected by the labor laws 
as examples of speech that the government may regulate); id. at 457–68 (ruling that a state bar 
may sanction a lawyer for making a prohibited in-person solicitation of a hospitalized client). 
Moreover, commercial speech is more readily verifiable by the speaker, Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772, and regulation is unlikely to deter worthwhile commercial speech due 
to the financial interest motivating the speaker, see, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 
(1977); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6.  
 228. SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 74. The new revenge porn criminal statutes do not invariably 
criminalize conduct protected by the First Amendment. If they apply only under circumstances 
where the parties agree or understand that an image shall remain private, those laws should 
withstand a free speech challenge. 
 229. 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
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whether a federal law prohibiting the interstate distribution of 
depictions of animal cruelty could withstand a First Amendment 
challenge. The relevant statute, section 48 of Title 18,230 made it a 
crime to create, sell, or possess so-called “crush videos”—namely, 
videotape depictions of the intentional torture and killing of 
defenseless small animals such as dogs, often by women barefoot or 
wearing high heels, accompanied by the helpless squeals of the 
animals.231 The Court found “startling and dangerous” the 
government’s argument that the courts could and should engage in 
what the Court described as a “highly manipulable” categorical 
balancing test directing the courts to weigh the pros and cons of 
particular types of speech.232 Stevens therefore protected information 
that barely makes any material contribution to any conceivable 
legitimate interest, let alone an important matter of legitimate public 
or private concern. The upshot is that the Court is unlikely to place 
revenge porn entirely out of bounds. 
Yet, there would be no need to resolve that question. The reason 
is that here, as in Cowles Media, tort liability would not rest on any 
basis that threatens government censorship because of the messages 
or ideas contained in a photograph. A tort or criminal offense 
protects only against the publication of private aspects of a person’s 
life that a reasonable person would find offensive and that breached 
an implicit promise of confidentiality. Accordingly, a Playboy model 
could not recover damages for the magazine’s use of her photos 
because they were taken with the clear understanding that they would 
be published.233 Limiting recovery in that manner—to instances in 
which a plaintiff can prove that an offensive publication betrayed a 
promise—would not jeopardize legitimate free speech concerns. 
Here, as in Cowles Media, tort liability would simply encourage 
people to keep their word. 
Professor Susan Gilles has argued that the Supreme Court would 
be unlikely to uphold a breach-of-confidentiality tort remedy because 
it targets a particular type of speech.234 In her view, the Court 
rejected the free speech defense in Cowles Media for three reasons: 
 
 230. 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2012). 
 231. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 465–66; H.R. REP. NO. 106-397, at 2–3 (1999). 
 232. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 465–66, 469–72. 
 233. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, at 867 (quoted supra at note 89). 
 234. See Gilles, supra note 52, at 71–83. 
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common law promissory estoppel principles do not target the media; 
that doctrine does not apply to a particular type of message; and 
promissory estoppel law is not aimed at “speech” in any form or, 
said the other way, the doctrine applies to all types of agreements not 
to engage in a particular activity, whether it is construction, 
commerce, or communication, while a breach-of-confidentiality tort 
is, by design, limited to speech.235 In my opinion, she has misread the 
Court’s decision in Cowles Media. Those factors may describe facts 
of the Cowles Media case, but Justice White’s opinion for the Court 
did not demand that all three be present in order for a claim to go 
forward.236 
Cowles Media involved a straightforward quid pro quo: In return 
for the information Cohen possessed, Cowles Media traded its free-
speech right to identify him in any story it would publish. What was 
critical to the Supreme Court’s ruling in that case was that Cowles 
Media freely entered into that agreement. Treating a breach of that 
promise as an occasion for affording relief under state law, the Court 
reasoned, no more infringes free speech principles than affording a 
remedy for broken promises having nothing to do with speech. First 
Amendment theory does not require that the law imprison individual 
or media defendants in their rights; they are free to exercise or trade 
them if they find it to their advantage to receive something else in 
return.237 Indeed, denying a plaintiff the opportunity to recover for a 
broken promise of confidentiality would elevate media defendants 
above everyone else in society who discloses confidential 
information, and the First Amendment does not entitled media 
defendants to occupy such a privileged status.238 
Cowles Media therefore allows the state to establish a tort or 
criminal remedy for the betrayal involved in the publication of 
revenge porn. The event that would trigger liability is the 
broadcasting of a photograph in violation of an express or implied 
agreement not to do precisely that. Imposing liability simply holds a 
defendant to his word.239 A revenge porn tort or criminal offense 
 
 235. See id. at 70. 
 236. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668–72 (1991). 
 237. That interpretation of Cowles Media also is consistent with Snepp, which did not rely on 
any of the factors cited by Professor Gilles. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.2 
(1980). 
 238. See supra notes 206–11 and accompanying text. 
 239. See Cowles Media, 501 U.S. at 669–70. 
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focuses on the injury arising from a breach of an express or implied 
agreement to keep that speech confidential. The risk of injury arises 
only because the parties communicate in a context where 
confidentiality is either stated or assumed. Take away that 
understanding and there is no tort and no crime.  
In this regard, imposing liability for revenge porn is not 
materially different from allowing a party to recover damages for her 
spouse’s, her attorney’s, her physician’s, or her minister’s breach of 
the confidentiality of their communications. The protection that tort 
or criminal law would provide in those settings would not censor 
anyone from speaking about a matter of public importance. That 
protection is limited to communications exchanged in a specific 
relationship between the parties that assumes confidences exchanged 
will be kept secret. American law recognizes that protecting the 
confidentiality of those relationships is important, and it would 
refuse to allow the government to demand that a lawyer, for 
example, breach his duty of confidentiality to his or her client even 
when doing so would be necessary to prove a defendant’s guilt in a 
criminal case. If so, it would be reasonable to conclude that a 
confidential relationship is both a legitimate and sufficiently 
desirable one that tort and criminal law should protect.240 Finally, it 
would be an odd rule of law that a party cannot waive his or her free 
speech rights. The Constitution permits each of us to waive various 
constitutional rights, such as the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy 
and public trial.241 Cowles Media—and Snepp—merely add the Free 
Speech Clause to that list. 
To be sure, the First Amendment protects the interests of 
listeners as well as speakers. A defendant in a revenge porn lawsuit 
doubtless would argue that he should not be held liable for 
broadcasting a photograph because liability would deprive third 
 
 240. Cf., e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 692 (1972) (“[W]e cannot seriously 
entertain the notion that the First Amendment protects a newsman’s agreement to conceal the 
conduct of his source, or the evidence thereof, on the theory that it is better to write about crime 
than to do something about it.”). 
 241. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) (ruling that a condemned prisoner can 
waive any federal constitutional claims that he could raise to challenge his conviction or 
sentence); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (ruling that a person can waive 
his or her Fourth Amendment rights); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (noting that 
a defendant can waive his or her Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial and Sixth Amendment 
rights to a jury trial and to confront his or her accusers); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464–65 
(1938) (ruling that a person can waive the Sixth Amendment right to be represented by counsel). 
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parties of the opportunity to see the images. But that argument is 
quite unpersuasive. There is no reason to be overly paternalistic and 
forbid someone from giving up his free speech rights for something 
that he valued more than expression, even for the sake of third 
parties. After all, if he kept his word and did not disclose a 
photograph, third parties would not have the benefit of seeing his 
former spouse or girlfriend. All that third parties are denied is one 
more photograph of a naked woman on the Internet. Given the 
number of images already available, the marginal loss to third parties 
is infinitesimal. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Justice Holmes once said that “hard cases” can “make bad 
law.”242 Sometimes, bad practices can make good law. Revenge porn 
certainly is an example of malicious conduct that injures the welfare 
of someone who mistakenly trusted an intimate partner. Allowing a 
victim of revenge porn to recover damages for publication that 
breaches an implicit promise of confidentiality is faithful to tort law 
principles and will not punish or chill the legitimate expression of 
free speech. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 242. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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